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Preface 
This essay was initially completed in August 2000 and revised 
during February 2001. Subsequent events 'have been 
disappointingly bloody, but do not alter the basis of the 
argument. This is the idea that relations between Israel and 
Palestine cannot be managed separately from, and by different 
external criteria to, those which prevail in the region. 
Geopolitical analysis shows that political behaviour in the 
region is driven by intentions expressed in culture and religion. 
Actors are motivated by interests in 'Globalisation' and 
exploitative western or regime stability, not by conflict 
re~olution. This is not to utter the truism that the only real peace 
will be a 'comprehensive peace'. Indeed 'separate peace' and 
:comp~ehensive p~ace' are equally and mutually unintelligible. 
Peace ~a~ be defmed only by fundamental values. Stability is a 
precondition for peace oruy if informed by such values. Hence, 
new norms and strategies are necessary, which must commence 
with the self-images of peoples and their leaders. The region is 
part of an international system, which it has the potential to 
destabilise. Strategies for stability and peace therefore ought to 
be shaped accordingly. 
I am grateful to two dear friends at the Royal Military 
College of Canada; Professor Lubomyr Luciuk created the 
op?ortunity for me to write this paper; Professor Jim Finan 
pomted out problems in the draft version. 
My thanks also go to Professor Efraim Inbar Director of the 
Begin-Sadat Cent~e for Strategic Studies at Bar:Ilan University, 
I~rael. Thr~~g_h his good offices, I was able to spend extended 
nme as a VIsitmg Scholar at the Centre during 1998 and 1999. I 
trust he will not be too disappointed with the fruits of my 
considerations. 
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I am indebted to friends and acquaintances in Universities, 
Institutes and Governments in Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Kuwait 
and other countries, who gave time to discuss some of the most 
difficult and important issues of or time. 
Annie Rapstoff deserves special mention for the patience with 
which she oversaw the seemingly interminable drafting of this 
paper. 
Thanks to Ewan Anderson and to Routledge, Taylor and 
Francis (Publishers) for the use of Maps published in, The 
Middle East: Geography and geopolitics. 
*** 
The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies has agreed to re-
issue this essay, which was first published in the series 
'Distinguished Speakers in Political Geography' by the Royal 
Military College of Canada in March 2001 as, Geopolitics and 
the new Middle East [ISBN 1-896354-26-2]. It had a small print 
run and soon became unavailable. I am deeply obliged to the 
Institute, and particularly to its Editor Tom Kristiansen. 
Though by no means unaffected by events of the past twenty-
seven months, the argument points to more systemic 
dichotomies: a deep existential gulf between all Israeli and all 
Palestinian political values; the undue weight of strategic 
expectations built around the Oslo Accords; and the wilful 
indifference with which, following the end of the Gulf War of 
1991, the United States and its western allies presided over the 
slow decay of prestige, trust and power that had been invested, 
by both themselves and their Middle East clients, in proposals 
for regional peace and stability. 
There is scarcely nothing here about the second Intifada, 
which, breaking out in September 2000, by December 2002 had 
seen over 2,800 Palestinian and Israeli fatalities. There is 
nothing directly about 11 •h September 2001. This was a defining 
moment in history, which saw western governments finally, yet 
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also for the first time, awaken to the implications of an unstable 
region awash with wealth, poverty, new technologies and 
ancient hatreds. President George W Bush calling for a war on 
international terrorism; his definition of an 'Axis of Evil' in the 
world; American-led military intervention in Afghanistan to 
oust the Taliban and root out AI Qa'eda- these were all future 
events at the time of writing. Although the risks entailed by the 
spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction are discussed in this 
monograph, I could not have guessed in September 2000 that 
just over two years later the United States would be on the brink 
of war with Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, or that North 
Korea would be using Washingron's distractions to expel 
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and re-open its 
own fissile plutonium facilities. 
But neither was I trying to second-guess the course of events. 
My stimulus to write this monograph was several years of travel 
to and from different countries in the Middle East, and a period 
of research and reflection at the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic 
Studies at Bar-Ilan University in Israel; a centre created in the 
names of two men whose human greatness, with that of 
President Jimmy Carter, almost transcended the burdens of 
history dividing their nations. 
Both before and during that attachment I was able to spend 
time among Palestinians, and saw vividly how their civil society 
structures, and the economic fabric of their family and daily 
lives, were being stretched thinner and thinner on the 
framework of Accords that promised everything later, but 
offered nothing now. I heard also my Israeli friends, peace-
loving people I trust implicitly, voicing, usually to oppose, a 
rising sentiment in Israeli society, that Yassir Arafat was not a 
trustworthy partner for peace. 
In the Gulf states I met people who had been to Kazakhstan, 
Afghanistan, Kashmir, China - intelligent Arabs, devout 
Muslims, often in disagreement, yet united in impatiently 
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wishing to move their societies forward, but also out of the all-
embracing influence of America. 
In Egypt I observed the palpable differences between a few 
efficient government agencies clustered around the figure of the 
national leader and his chief deputies, and the sprawling mass of 
inefficient semi-literate hidden unemployment that passes for the 
remainder of the state bureaucracy. Yet even if desperately poor 
by comparison with the privileged few, that great bureaucratic 
tranche of society is lifted inestimably higher than the urban 
labourer; or the peasant farmer; or the landless poor who 
subsist in the countryside and collect around the public 
buildings and tourist routes of all of the cities. 
According to the self-image of western democracy we live in 
an era of mass society. Somehow, everybody matters. And if 
that is because we have Rights, well, these have been gained; 
through collective as well as individual effort. Sometimes, 
indeed, Rights- have been wrung from unrepresentative and 
unwilling governments. But when westerners do 'foreign 
relations' - above all American - mass society is forgotten. 
Polite references to democracy become explicitly rhetorical 
when compared with the action points pursued by diplomats, 
soldiers, business-people and even journalists. 
Somehow, domestic politics are about things we want for 
ourselves; whereas international politics are about things we 
want from others. Through the spread of Nationalism this 
pervading western unwillingness to think about the needs of 
other societies has become virtually universal. Consequently, 
'Globalisation' means exactly what the country or leader or 
organisation using that term wants it to mean, neither more nor 
less. Whatever may be said on behalf of these structures of 
( 
western life in the world today, they systematically fail to 
understand the relationship between international security and 
socio-economic development. 
No region of the world expresses that failing more graphically 
than the Middle East. And nowhere are the consequences of that 
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failing more deadly, or more threatening to other countries and 
regions. It was this conclusion which led me to argue that the 
western powers need a new Geopolitical understanding of the 
Middle East. 
This should relate together security and development; link the 
bloody struggle between Israel and the Palestinians to the regime 
ambitions of Saddam's Iraq; perceive the peril of external 
influences entering the Middle East, and anticipate the global 
ramifications of regional events; cease under-estimating the 
power of tradition, and the value of controlling territory, 
because the strategic culture of the western powers over-
estimates what can be seen and done from Space. 
Other monographs now need to be written about chapters of 
events that have been unfolding in recent time. However, I 
believe those central contentions in what I wrote nearly two-
and-a-half years ago do not need alteration. 
It is a touching sign of confidence that the Norwegian 
Institute for Defence Studies has chosen to re-publish my 
monograph with only minor revisions; though no doubt the 
Institute would also say that once one began the process of 
making revisions, it would become obvious that a new 
monograph should be written. I do not resist that judgement; 
and rather hope that the Editor will ask me to do so in due 
course. 
Hugh Macdonald 
Oxford, December 2002 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Until recently there was a consensus among observers of the 
Middle East that a 'new' region is emerging. What that meant 
was the topic of much disagreement, especially about what kind 
of international relations the 'new' region would have. Today, 
the very notion of renewal is challenged. UN sanctions against 
Iraq are crumbling. The regime of Saddam Hussein has regained 
much credibility. A second Palestinian Intifada is underway, and 
the Palestinian Authority may lose control over its own people. 
The February 2001 election in Israel brought defeat to a Prime 
Minister who sought 'two states for two peoples' on territory 
and security. Beneath a surface calm enforced by authoritarian 
regimes, there are tremors of revolution in Iran, Turkey, Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia. In Washington, apathy prevails over the state 
of the Oslo peace process. In contrast, activism is growing on 
the part of numerous non-regional actors, including Russia, 
China and EU countries. Trans-national influences are 
pervading the region, bringing new challenges through 
Globalisation, terrorism, low-intensity conflict, the spread of 
WMD technologies, drugs, 'black' economic activities, and, 
perhaps most important of all, new values, perceptions and 
rationales for conflict. 
The aim here is to 'work around' the profound disagreements 
that this scene is generating, accounting for doctrinal differences 
or particular schools of thought only incidentally, when relevant 
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to the geopolitical methodology employed. What that entails is 
discussed more fully in Section 3. Here, the scope of the paper 
can be stated as follows: 
• In the context of world politics there are forces that operate 
uniquely or with particular effect in and upon the Middle 
East. 
• In consequence, however the region is defined 
geographically, its limits and bounds can only be detected by 
geopolitical analysis. 
• Therefore an analysis that accounts for change must relate 
phenomena that appear specific to the region, to such causal 
generalities as the rules, forces and structures of an 
international system. 
This geopolitical analysis is developed so as to explore what the 
'new' Middle East is about; how its features might differ from 
the familiar; and what interactions may develop between the 
region, other regions, and the structures of world politics. Key 
dimensions of the region are shown in tables and maps (at the 
end of the study). But its arguments are toward structures, issues 
and interactivity, rather than descriptive analysis of what is 
particular, and already 'in' the region. 
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Chapter 2 
Camp David II 
On 25 July 2000, Bill Clinton left Camp David, announcing that 
negotiations between Ehud Barak and Y assir Arafat were not 
capable of producing an agreement between Israel and the 
Palestinians. The American President had ostensibly set his cap 
at success, diverting other business for almost three weeks, 
spending most days with the negotiating parties, delaying his 
departure for the G-8 summit in Okinawa, cutting his time there 
so as to return to the talks. The term 'failure' was widely used to 
describe the outcome. Yet this surprised nobody. When the 
Prime Minister and the President-in-waiting of the state of 
Palestine landed at airports scarcely forty miles apart, at Tel 
Aviv and Gaza, each was lauded by his own people. 
The talks had been sponsored and pressed by the western 
powers, notably the US. The conflicting parties discussed 
Jerusalem, borders, refugees, resources and security. This was 
done 'on the record' and with a view to a 'package' deal. The 
talks did not break down. The Israelis offered more in territory 
and status to nascent Palestine than ever before, including 
'shared sovereignty' in East Jerusalem, and the return of over 
ninety per cent of occupied territories. But the Palestinians were 
not prepared to accept; for, in exchange, Palestine would have 
had to surrender powerful constraints on the return of refugees, 
control of regional resources, and the structure and external 
relations of their new state. 
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The 'realistic' outcome proffered by an Israel speaking in 
pragmatic and future oriented terms was rejected by Palestine. 
Yet the pragmatic question remains. How else can two proud 
nations share an essentially borderless territory? Instead, 
Palestine preferred to pursue an 'idealist' outcome. UN Security 
Council Resolutions and the legal-moral principle of self-
determination require the end of 'Zionist occupation'; an 
unconditional 'Right of Return' for Palestinians dispossessed of 
their homes in 1948 and 1967, and for their descendants; and 
recognition of East Jerusalem as the sovereign capital of 
Palestine. This at least is a good paradigmatic explanation. We 
shall have plenty of scope to examine and test it later. For the 
moment, though, other aspects of the situation following the 
'failure' of Camp David are more interesting. 
Whereas the US administration announced immediately that 
American envoys would resume the search for agreement, 
reaction elsewhere was muted, implying different expectations 
and a longer time horizon. 
In Israel, Barak's 'failure' was full of consequence. Within a 
few weeks he was trailing in opinion polls, having been the most 
popular Prime Minister ever when elected the previous year. 
Secular Israelis, whose wish for peace might have led them in 
other conditions to give even more, were deserting him. Many 
religious Jews welcomed this. The ultra-Orthodox, whose status 
and role might become marginal in a state at peace with 
neighbours, sharing sovereignty in Jerusalem, were 
irreconcilable. Arguably, all of this was just what Barak needed, 
since his fractious coalition government would have dissolved in 
the face of any feasible agreement, and did so anyway, making 
an early election unavoidable. 
Chairman Arafat, privately willing to accept the package on 
offer at Camp David, flew home via Cairo. There, he explained 
his 'failure' to President Mubarak in terms of American and 
Israeli pressures to concede the sacred principle of the right of 
return of refugees to their original homes in what he thus still 
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refused to recognise as 'Israel'. Mubarak endorsed this position, 
as did the regime in Saudi Arabia. Hence two of America's three 
most important regional allies rejected the settlement outright, if 
indirectly; and as we have seen the third, Israel, was at best 
equivocal. 
In another quarter of the region, too, rejection remained the 
slogan of the day. Even before his electoral victory over 
Benjamin Netanyahu in May 1999, Barak had told the world of 
his aim to settle the long and disastrous military entanglement of 
Israel in South Lebanon, and to pursue a settlement with Syria 
as the first priority of his foreign policy. Barak was consistent in 
this. Even when settlement with Syria proved impossible, he 
carried through a unilateral military withdrawal, oversaw the 
dissolution of the SLA, Israel's puppet 'ally', and absorbed into 
northern Israel a Lebanese migration comprising perhaps 
100,000 Christians, Druse and Muslims. 
What Barak could not do was commit Syria's leader, Hafez 
al-Asad, to a final agreement on return of the Golan Heights to 
Syrian sovereignty. This was offered in principle. But it would 
be the central component of a wider agreement. In practice, the 
US would have brokered a settlement in which Syria controlled 
activities on the ground, but not security or airspace in this vital 
upland region. Symbolically, Asad insisted on return of the 
entire territory, without regard to Israel's claims regarding 
security and water. Substantively, he knew this could not be, 
without causing another war that would be disastrous for his 
country. On key issues, tangible differences were small, and in a 
'Realist' account could be bridged by American guarantees. But 
Asad's 'Idealism' about Arab territory kept his more powerful 
Israeli adversary wriggling on a hook that comprised wider and 
more complex Syrian aims. Those included preserving influence 
with other regional actors (Iran, Saudi Arabia) and non-regional 
powers (France, Russia); maintaining a stake in the Palestinian 
struggle (Hamas); controlling water and other resources in and 
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adjacent to the Golan; and conserving Syria's interests in 
Lebanon (Hizbollah).1 
Asad's death in June 2000 was followed shortly, but after a 
significant pause, by the formal adoption of his son Bashar as 
President. This and other signals showed that the conciliation of 
diverse interests in Syria's society would now occur through 
collegial rather than personal control over institutions. It 
remains to be seen what this will amount to in practice. But in 
Syria, for so long the self-proclaimed 'ftont line' of principled 
resistance to Israel's strategies in the occupied territories, there 
was particular satisfaction that the Camp David talks 'failed'. 
Given the power of symbols, Asad's death might have been 
sufficient to guarantee that failure in the Arab world. 2 
Hence the notion of 'playing to the gallery' is helpful and 
important to understanding the Middle East. But actors are not 
doing this in the same way that ideas and values transposed 
from a western drama might suggest. There is no 
straightforward 'fit' between 'Realism' and 'Idealism'. Sacred 
and real, historic and present, the syntax of mood, anger and 
1 Among the most useful news online resources on IsraeVSyria!Lebanon are: 
http://www.bbc.eo.uk/hi/englishlin_depth!middle_east/2000/mideast_peace_ 
processldefault.stm; http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk/index.htm; 
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/proche-orient/region-Jiban; 
http://www.albawaba.com/. More specialised sites cover security and border 
issues, histories, leadership debates, etc: http://www.israel-
mfa.gov.iVmfa/go.asp?MFAHOOsoO; http://www.moi-syria.com/links.htm; 
http://www.biu.ac.iUSOGbesa/meria/news/htm; · 
http://nybooks.com/nyrev/wwwarchdisplay.cgi?200006150/0P; 
http://www.mideastnews.com/htm; 
http://www.passia.org/palesrine_facts/MAPS!Israei_Syria_demilitarised_zone 
s.htm. . 
2
'Beyond the barrel of the gun and the confines of the torture chamber 
P?litical cults work to generate compliance by producing, through syrr:bolic 
displays, the potential for coercive power while also economizing on its 
actual use[ ... ] Asad's cult" and the features it seems to share with post-
Stalinist East European political cults and ideology suggest a potentially 
general understanding of language and symbols as political strategies that 
clutter public space, producing acts of narration that are depoliticising. ': 
Wedeen, Ambiguities of domination, pp. 156-8. 
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acceptance; all are arranged differently in Middle Eastern 
societies than in open, democratic, western societies. Israel is, of 
course, both an open society and a western state in the Middle 
East. But this generalisation about symbols, actions and political 
life extends, too, largely if not completely, to Israel. For example 
on 7 August 2000 Rabbi Oveida Josef, spiritual leader of Shas, 
one of the major parties in Barak's coalition, condemned the 
Camp David negotiations by comparing the Palestinians to 'a 
snake'. In the same soliloquy he also repeated his long 
established claim that the holocaust was visited upon Jews who 
had reincarnated from sinful previous lives. Shas is capable of 
determining the outcome of an election, or of coalition politics. 3 
This fusion of the symbolic and the actual can have dramatic 
consequences. Saddam Hussein's attempted annexation of 
Kuwait in 1990, which western strategic analysts have written 
off as a case of 'confused signals', was about the fact that 
Saddam believed in a historical mission which years of war with 
Iran had entitled him to fulfil. Ten years earlier, an attempt to 
forcibly rescue American hostages in Teheran escalated into a 
confrontation full of consequence with the entire Iranian people. 
In this region 'the gallery' leaders are playing to incorporates 
spectators, who experience active participation in the action. At 
the same time, numerous actors beyond the region invisibly 
shape action, through the politics of oil, weapons, wealth, and 
the weaknesses of formal institutions. In this highly complex 
shaping process, out of which a 'new' Middle East is supposedly 
emerging, the core conflict between Israel and its neighbours 
therefore remains the central, decisive impediment to change 
and stabilisation. · 
Thus both the 'failure' of Camp David, and a certain pattern 
of response to failure, tell us a great deal about the geopolitics of 
3
'For anyone who took the time to read his very detailed publications on the 
question of pikuach nefesh (the sanctity of life) and the Land of Israel, it 
was clear that the Sephardim leader is neither a dove, in terms that are 
familiar to the secular left, nor[ ... ] politically naive.': Steinberg, Land, 
peace and Shas. 
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the Middle East. Our observations so far indicate that the 
conflict is both ongoing, and susceptible to management. It is; 
simultaneously, a substantive struggle for political power in the 
widest sense, and a drama invested with historic and symbolic 
significance. It has a wide range of participating actors. Some 
play parts that are central, even though located at a distance; 
whilst others are marginal, even though located close to the 
geographical heart of things. Moreover, the status of various 
actors is subject to change, through change of leaders, 
generation change, and the consequences of choice in their roles 
and gestures. We may also sense, though it is difficult to 
observe, that much of the action is unscripted. 
Our quest from this juncture is to discover what geopolitics 
can tell us about this 'old' conflict and the 'new' region in its 
world setting. 
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Chapter 3 
Geopolitics 
The discipline of Geopolitics forms part of the study of several 
other subjects, of which Geography, Economics and Politics are 
the most important. Geopolitics has found its most persistently 
successful applications, and many of its strongest limitations, 
within the civil-military tradition of Strategic Studies. As a 
formal discipline in the contemporary curriculum, Geopolitics is 
a relatively new subject, dating from the later nineteenth 
century. But its contemporary roots are to be found over several 
centuries, in the technological revolutions that gave global 
domination to Europe and the west. A reading of Dava Sobel's 
Longitude demonstrates why! 
Technological mastery of geography was important to the 
expanding western world in the eighteenth century. By being 
able to precisely correlate longitude, a ship could plot a course 
that minimised the distance it would travel during its voyage. 
Both for warships and for commercial vessels carrying time 
sensitive cargoes this was a crucial advantage, which, taken 
together with known topography of the sea, tended to create 
ever more precise shipping lanes. But that then meant that 
maritime military strategy could depend less on large fleets in 
being than on smaller concentrations of naval power, able to 
link together via a system of naval bases. Alfred Mahan's, The 
Influence of Seapower upon History provided a theoretical 
4Sobel, Lo11gitude. 
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explanation of what followed from such technological 
developments and their associated geography: 
• The course of history has been shaped by specific decisions, 
each having its own human causality; 
• Geographic factors formed a cultural and economic context 
for these decisions; 
• The determinate outcome has been the accumulation and 
relative distribution of power; 
• In this process, Britain gained strong comparative 
advantages; 
• Such geopolitical determinism is not incompatible with free 
trade and interdependence in the world economy; 
• Countries possessing similar attributes might emulate 
Britain.5 
That puzzling literary achievement, Mason and Dixon by 
Thomas Pynchon, concerns the application of astronomical data 
to global positioning in the eighteenth century. It shows us that 
in land-locked disputes, as at sea, the new technologies of 
'precise' measurement had the capacity to excite 'worm holes of 
paranoia' over the delimitation of boundaries between states. 6 
In this sense 'geopolitical' conflict, via the advance of 
technologies of mapping and measurement, acquired a self-
generating capacity. In a historic region such as the Middle East 
there are still today at least fifteen significant international . 
boundary issues, some of which have generated crises or wars. 
Three we have met so far comprise boundaries between Israel 
and the Palestinians, Israel and Syria, and Iraq and Kuwait. The 
proximate cause of the eight year long Iran-Iraq war was the 
boundary between the two countries in the Shatt al-Arab 
waterway. 
5Sumida, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician, in Gray & Sloan, 
Geopolitics, pp. 47-60. 
6Pynchon, Mason & Dixon. 
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Halford Mackinder offered a general theory of the political 
significance of geography, with particular reference to the 
constant interplay of forces vying with one another across 
frontiers: 
The course of politics is the product of two sets of forces, 
impelling and guiding. The impetus is from the past, in the 
history embedded in a people's character and tradition. The 
present guides the movement by economic wants and 
geographical opportunities. Statesmen and diplomats succeed 
and fail pretty much as they recognise the irresistible power of 
these forces. 7 
In the world today still more complex calculations of time-space 
relations are contributing to a future theoretical Astropolitics. 
As Everett Dolman tells us, efficient travel through space entails 
specific orbits and transit routes that because of their advantages 
in fuel efficiency create natural corridors of movement and 
commerce. Hence, because of gravity wells and the cost of 
getting fuel to orbit, space-faring nations will be bound to 
develop specific pathways of heaviest traffic. What follows is the 
verdict that: 
The maximum benefit to be gained from the riches of space 
will come as the result of a long-term globally co-operative 
effort. Nonetheless, so powerful is the lure of astropolitics 
that the relative gains anticipated for the state that 
successfully dominates space continues to provide a 
compelling incentive to act unilaterally.' 
The argument so far can now be generalised. Practical problems 
('How do I fix my position at sea?') create technological puzzles. 
Technological solutions emerge, which carry prospectively large 
7Quoted in Gray & Sloan, Geopolitics, p. 2, from Mackinder The physical 
basis of political geography. 
8Dolman, Geostrategy in the space age in Gray & Sloan, Geopolitics, p. 
104. 
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implications for military strategy and for commerce. Whether 
perceived in terms of security, or in terms of profit, the· 
percentage changes induced by technological change in any 
given status quo are significant. This establishes both the need 
for analysis, and the demand for theoretical rigour equivalent to 
the technological rigour of the dynamic physical arrangements 
(naval bases, land boundaries, astroports). But, do astropolitics 
provide the incentive for competition as well as the means of 
managing it'? Without knowing the answer, we understand that 
Geopolitics needs to become a discipline, concerned not only 
with questions of method, but also of knowledge. 
For the past century we have lived, for the first time in 
history, with a 'closed' geographical system, and with a 
superabundance of economic and military power. These factors 
make 'world domination' a more sustainable strategy of power 
than ever before. Various totalitarian systems have attempted to 
get there, underpinned by strong philosophies that address 'the 
will to power'. Yet we also live in an era of ideological 'freedom' 
in individual, economic and political arrangements. Numerous 
existential thinkers have informed the world that 'it is all 
relative', or anyhow that the mystery of identity dwells within 
us, and not 'out there' in the world. 
But even when methodological rigour has given us a thorough 
familiarity with the strengths and limitations of military 
technologies, strategic planning may spectacularly fail to match 
predicted requirements with real-world outcomes. The 
analytical realities behind Britain's diplomacy of world power 
turned into insoluble guesses concerning the greater likelihood 
of war requiring more land power and war requiring more sea 
power. The Shlieffen Plan could not alter the fact that Germany 
was trapped by geography between Russia and France, and 
would be obliged to divide its armies unless one or the other 
adversary could be neutralised. As an advisor to the British 
government, Mackinder recommended greater intervention in 
Bolshevik Russia during its civil war, but was turned down by a 
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Cabinet that was weary of war. Hitler's armies were unable to 
overcome the immensity and psychological drag imposed by 
Ukraine, Russia and Yugoslavia. The Second World War was 
won not by a single grand strategy, but by two that at the end of 
the day proved politically and ideologically incompatible. In the 
Yom Kippur War, as in Vietnam, one side won a decisive 
political victory by comprehensively losing the war on the 
battlefield. The Revolution in Military Affairs is said to have 
triumphed in Kosovo; but that still required Milosevic to arrive 
at a Clausewitzian conclusion that he ought to accept a limited 
defeat. 
Hence there are key epistemological questions in the 
discipline of Geopolitics: 
• 
0 
What technological and geographical conditions can we 
discover in which an actor's strategic response to conflict 
will be behaviourally determined? 
Under what conditions are strategic actors able to transcend 
technological and geographical constraints in responding to 
conflict? 
In the approach taken by Mahan, geopolitical theory is required 
to be behaviouralist, in the sense that it derives predictable 
behaviour from axioms concerning a 'closed' physical system, 
and thus generates predictable 'parameters' on conflict. 
Following Clausewitz, another approach holds that military-
political strategy must be existentialist, recognising the power of 
a people, regardless of technological parameters, to endure 
ultimate, absolute, sacrifice.' 
9Mahan's explanation of international relations and conflict turned on the 
concepts of pre-determining geopolitical conditions and 'optimal' decisions 
by national governments: Sumida, Alfred Thayer Mahan, p. 51. The role 
allocated to political and strategic choice was essentially the same for 
Mahan as that found in Mackinder's later explanation of the 'world 
system': Sloan, Sir Ha/ford Mackinder, p. 22. The theory is that history is 
made by large forces: 'Success' in politics is about identifying, managing and 
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This polarity in epistemology is neither accidental nor 
avoidable. Mahan wrote about trade and power against the 
background of British ascendancy and the ideas of Charles 
Darwin. Hence a rational creature in a systemic setting would 
not knowingly make itself extinct. Clausewitz wrote about war 
against the background of Napoleon in the era of Immanuel 
Kant, for both of whom freedom was not a material condition 
but a moral achievement. The recognition that behaviouralism 
and existentialism offer radically different accounts of what we 
ought to expect from the conduct of groups in conflict, and that 
each leads in a different prescriptive direction with regard to 
strategic policy, are not insurmountable difficulties. But anyone 
seeking a definition of Geopolitics must 'work around' this 
epistemic divide. 
Physics must also grapple with incompatible epistemologies, 
notably those of Newton and Einstein. Sir Richard Penrose at 
Oxford is working on 'Twister theory', which theorises how, 
when one comes 'down to earth' or goes 'out into space', 
adjustments must be made between the 'readouts' of each 
framework. We may conjecture that such adjustments between 
two frameworks of theory could be helpful in addressing the 
geopolitics of the Middle East.. . 
Similarly, the solution.proposed here is to retreat prudentially 
to a viewpoint situated in methodology. Geopolitics treats 'small 
scale' (i.e. sub-systemic) conflicts by applying a 'template' drawn 
applying these forces. It follows that this behaviouralism (ie. there are 
objectively determinable 'good' and 'bad' choices for political actors) can be 
turned into a science of politics, or geopolitics. Contrast this with the 
Kantian subjectivity of Clausewitz, who held that the dynamic motor of 
~o~~i~ and war is 'political will'. Power is constituted through this will by a 
tnruty of army, government and people. There are conditioning forces 
within histo~ ('The ·changing balance of power'): but these are not systemic; 
are always hable to be overturned, or even to cause wars· and will be 
rapidly and perhaps unexpectedly transcended because c~nflict always tends 
to esca~ate towards the Absolute. It follows that a subjective actuality 
determmes 'the primacy of the political aim': Howard, The influence of 
Clausewitz, p. 43. On systems generally, see Taylor, Toward a new world 
order. 
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from 'large-scale' (i.e. systemic) mapping of forces and 
interactions. It is tempting to believe, and often proves wrong so 
to do, that because the large-scale techniques can successfully 
'cover' the small-scale conflicts, therefore the small-scale 
conflicts form - or can be· made to form - parts of disciplined 
geopolitical outcomes. We coerce the problem being addressed 
to fit the available solutions. But that problem is about poor 
practice, and is not fatal to the discipline. 
Hence we propose a definition and initial demonstration of 
what for the purpose of this essay is meant by Geopolitics: 
The study of spatial dimensions that are primary to 
understanding and managing conflict, particularly inasmuch 
as new technologies make certain geographical arrangements 
more salient for strategic policy than others, and thus 
generate a demand for theoretical explanations of how 
geography and technology might interact in political and 
economic terms. 
In the Middle East, certain of these spatial dimensions can be 
located in fixed centres. For example, the struggle between Islam 
and Judaism has its epicentre in Jerusalem. Here, neither of 
these great religions can yield permanent dominance to the 
other. Mecca and Medina are in Saudi Arabia, which means 
that a conservative Sunni regime and society must periodically 
share its space with millions of pilgrims, including those from 
Shia Iran. The regional strategic nuclear balance lies between Tel 
Aviv and Damascus, though Baghdad, Riyadh and Teheran 
have also come to figure. Potent linkages may exist, in future 
even more than today, between religious convictions and the 
regional spread ofWMD. 
Demographic forces are less centred, but underlie the peace 
process between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel has imported 
a large population of Jews from the former Soviet-type societies, 
though the identity and loyalties of these incomers have created 
important tensions. But Israel's Arab population is growing even 
faster than the rate of Jewish immigration and reproduction, 
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and both are outstripped by the growth of populations in the 
Palestinian territories. Inexorably, this is shifting the terms of 
coexistence. Jordan, weak in other respects, can crucially 
influence that process. It is primarily economic demography that 
has made Egypt the leader of the Arab countries in their 
strategic dialogue with Israel, though it also has historic ties 
with Palestine and especially Gaza. 
Resources, notably oil and finance, are widely dispersed 
across the Arab Middle East. Since access to oil is indispensable 
for all industrialised countries, this gives some Arab states 
influence beyond the region. Saudi Arabia is assisted to remain 
the guardian of Sunni orthodoxy. Iraq would enjoy the status of 
the most powerful Sunni Islamic state, had its economy not 
foundered in war and sanctions. Through another resources, 
water, Turkey, which exercises control over the headwaters of 
the Tigris and Euphrates, and decisively influences the long-term 
economic potential of the region. High technology affords 
another resource, which the finances of the Arab world may 
allow it to acquire mastery of in due course. For the foreseeable 
future, however, Israel possesses unique strength and diversity in 
military technologies, computer development, banking, 
commerce, agriculture and information systems. 
Iran, through its revolution, has aspired to lead a movement 
of Islamic renewal against regimes that have become too 
conservative, or too close to the west. It exerts ideological and 
religious influence in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, as well as in 
the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. Even though much of Iran's natural 
resources and industrial strength have been vitiated by war or 
constrained by sanctions, Teheran can argue that its religious 
resolve and sacrifice alone prevent Israel from winning decisive 
advantages in the peace process promoted by the west. Yet Iran 
faces a similar problem to the Saudis through the allegiance of 
millions of Shiites, in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, who look 
to Iran for direction or even refuge. 
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It can now be shown that 'Peace' is not a simple option, or a 
straightforward alternative to war. Through Globalisation and a 
culture of western security thinking, 'peace' has come to mean 
conflict resolution by states through mutual adjustments of 
interest. In those terms, peace treaties have been reached 
between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Jordan. Israel, Turkey 
and Jordan have a trilateral security arrangement. Turkey, a 
predominately Moslem society, is a member of NATO and an 
aspiring member of the EU. Lebanon has also aspired to join the 
'peace process', but has been frustrated because of internal and 
external factors. This culture of peacemaking sits uneasily in a 
region where religions and societies, shaped by their experiences 
over centuries beforehand, have few fundamental values and 
perceptions in common. 
By looking at these spatial dimensions we can see that, all 
differences notwithstanding, a web of international connections 
anchors the Middle East into a world system of political, 
economic and social relations. 
As noted above, access to oil reserves is the single most 
important geopolitical determinant of strategic behaviour. In 
turn, Middle East developments have crucially influenced 
stability and order in world politics. At least ten major wars and 
violent confrontations have erupted in the region since the 
Second World War. Directly or indirectly these have shaped 
energy crises, and the economies and societies of virtually all 
countries. Wars have also led to UN peacekeeping operations in 
Sinai, the Golan and Lebanon. 
Today, the US protects Israel, patronises Egypt and relies 
upon Saudi Arabia. The US is therefore bound to strive for a 
mutually acceptable regional stability that will underpin its vital 
interests. The Oslo Agreements of 1993 and 1995 created a 
negotiating process between Israel and the PA, related to 
UNSCR 242 and 336. The financial balances of the OPEC 
countries extend their influence, and help guarantee that Israel 
will eventually concede the 'occupied territories' to a new 
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Palestinian state. Israel also faces a substantial Arab economic 
embargo, which has eased only slightly in recent times. 
At the same time Israel has key economic and technology 
relationships with India and China as well as the US and EU. 
Turkey trades freely with Israel as well as with Arab countries. 
Both Saudi Arabia and Israel, though professed enemies, enjoy 
strong trade and technology links with China. Other actors also 
seek influence in regional affairs. The EU is developing its CFSP. 
China, Russia, India, Japan and other countries search for 
markets or finance. 
Much of this prevailing pattern of international relations 
would be affected by a comprehensive regional peace. Both 
people and geography in the region seem ripe for rapid 
development. But it can be questioned whether the states of the 
region are ready. Moreover, there is little infrastructure and few 
regional institutions. 
Islam and Judaism are world religions. Islam has a billion 
followers. Judaism has maybe twenty million. Yet Judaism 
participated in the classical world that originated western 
philosophy, and directly shaped Christianity and the core values 
of western civilisation. Indirectly, too, secularised Judaism and 
individual Jews have contributed greatly to the western culture 
of modernity and science. In comparison, Islam's influence has 
been limited and indirect. But Islam has had an enormous, 
largely unmeasured, influence within the world that was 
dominated until recent decades by western colonialism. Cultures 
as diverse as the Mahgreb and Mashraq, the Arabian peninsula, 
Iraq, Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh, all attest to this. 
Hence it is that in today's world, all three of these great 
religious creeds meet and overlap in Palestine. In a world rapidly 
approaching material Globalisation, it is apparently paradoxical 
that this concentration of devotional beliefs in Jerusalem should 
constitute a grave impediment to a 'final status' agreement 
between Israel and Palestine. Yet it is so. Indeed within the 
Islamic world there has been a rediscovery of the existential 
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power of religious policy. Initially confined to the Iranian 
revolution, which frightened the Sunni Arab world and 
contributed to the Iran-Iraq war, Shiism has begun to generate 
'alternative model' responses to the cultural values of western 
modernity, the pressures of Globalisation, and the formulaic 
behaviouralist ideas that dominate western strategic studies. 
Now we can begin to substantiate the theoretical divide 
outlined earlier, between the behaviouralist and existential 
determinants of strategic conduct. 
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Chapter 4 
Globalisation 
Unlike Geopolitics, 'Globalisation' is not a discipline. Rather, it 
is an aspiration searching for an agenda; or, in a stronger form, 
it is a doctrine pursuing the establishment of a mass following, 
in other words an ideology. It is this latter form of Globalisation 
that is of interest here. As such, any proposed definition would 
be disputed. It is therefore necessary to choose one with which 
to begin. 
Tony Blair in Britain, whose political thought is influenced by 
Anthony Giddens, has often spoken approvingly of 
Globalisation. Giddens in, The Third Way writes of 
'Globalization' (sic) and 'Individualism' as two of 'five 
dilemmas' facing the renewal of Social Democracy. A summary 
of the argument is as follows: 
• Economic 'globalization' is a new reality, not a continuation 
of previous stages of economic history. 
• 'Globalization' is not primarily about economic 
interdependence, but about the transformation of time and 
space in our lives. Distant events affect us immediately. 
Decisions we take as individuals are global in their 
implications. 
• A world of instantaneous electronic communication, in 
which even those in the poorest regions are involved, shakes 
up local institutions and everyday patterns of life. 
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o The pressure exerted by 'globalization' is affecting the 
position and power of states all over the world. Sovereignty 
is no longer 'an all-or-nothing matter'. 
o The 'scope of government' expands rather than diminishes 
as 'globalization' proceeds. 
o Nations retain considerable governmental, economic and 
cultural power over citizens and in the external arena. 
• 'Governance' becomes a more relevant concept than 
'government' to refer to some forms of administrative or 
regulatory capacity. 
• A 'new individualism' is associated with the retreat of 
tradition and custom from our lives 'under the impact of 
'globalization' rather than just the influence of markets'. 
o 'Institutionalised new individualism' demands that, 'All of 
us have to live in a more open and reflective manner than 
previous generations'. This is the way to realise greater 'Self-
fulfilment, the fulfilment of potential' under 'greater 
democratization' (sic).10 
The first two of these claims deserve immediate comment. 
The claim that economic Globalisation is a 'reality' has 
considerable statistical support. Since the 1950s, world trade has 
grown beyond anything seen previously. Trade between 
national economies has consistently grown faster than trade 
within national economies. Various multinational corporations 
have an annual turnover greater than the GDP of small or 
middle-sized nations. Commercial foreign direct investment is 
the leading instrument of finance-driven development, world-
wide. Aggregate demand, conceived in terms of a circular flow 
of income, consumption, savings and investment, cannot be 
managed by the macro-economic decisions of single 
governments. Global interdependence has been demonstrated by 
the interactive consequences of changes in resource prices. Thus, 
a comparatively inelastic demand for oil in terms of its price has 
10Giddens, The third way, pp. 28-37. 
32 FORSVARSSTUDIER 5/2002 
permitted the OPEC countries to influence the strategic policies 
of the world's industrial and military powers. At the same time, 
the high price-elasticity of demand for many primary products 
has caused recurrent debt and exchange rate crises for most of 
the developing countries. The economic crises of 1997-1998 in 
Asia-Pacific, Latin America and Russia, showed how trans-
national flows of capital can rapidly alter the fiscal viability of 
entire national economies and their largest corporations. 
None the less, when one departs from the customary models 
of economic growth, the economic 'reality' of Globalisation is 
more difficult to demonstrate. Yes, international trade has 
grown much faster than intra-national trade. Some economies, 
like that of Britain, are highly dependent on cyclical movements 
in the world economy. But regional trade within NAFT A, or the 
EU, is growing at a faster rate than world trade overall. This 
might just mean that economic Globalisation is being led by 
regional growth. And regional institutions may be strengthened 
at the expense of both national and global institutions. 
By way of contrast, some regions, such as the Middle East, 
exhibit growth largely through inter-regional rather than intra-
regional or intra-national exchange. It is plausible to consider 
that the primary resources of these regions may be siphoned off 
in a process of Globalisation that leaves them, ultimately, bereft 
of sustainable development. And if one looks at primarily 
qualitative indicators of development, such as the UN Human 
Development Index, it is difficult to arrive at any statistically . 
significant 'global' correlation between income, economic 
growth, and human development. Statistics show the variability 
of social conditions among societies, and the depth of the divide 
between different levels of living in the most and least developed 
ecOnomies. 11 
The second main claim Giddens makes is that 'globalization' 
transforms time and space in their relationships to the 
11Todaro, Economic development; UN Development Programme, Human 
development report 2000. · 
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individual. At a technological level, new spatial-temporal 
relations are being created, most graphically represented by the 
'virtual', and by the World-Wide-Web. As with earlier 
technological revolutions, this will have geopolitical 
consequences. However, the notion that the lives of individuals 
will be profoundly altered by the immediacy of distant events is 
at best contentious and at worst superficial. Historically, 
peoples' lives in one place have constantly been affected by 
distant events. The Internet or CNN make little difference to 
that. Existentially, the impact of a distant event, for instance the 
death of Princess Diana, is likely to be less than the impact of 
that which is immediate but local. 
There is also a conundrum in this claim about time and space. 
Giddens is setting relativity of time and space within the human 
consciousness, against the empirical measurement of distance 
and time by the clock. It may be that the events of 
'globalization' take over our lives, but that is not the same thing 
as a revolution in human consciousness. 
Having noticed these early concerns about 'globalization', let 
us note what may be compelling about the envisioned system: 
• It justifies abrupt change in the lives of individuals, nations 
or regions by claiming to be eo-terminus with the idea of 
'common humanity'. 
• All individuals are expected to make a transforming effort to 
identify themselves as participants in 'globalization', on the 
calculus that the benefits from doing so outweigh the costs 
of tradition, custom, or reflexive resistance to interference. 
• There are rules: participation means commitment, especially 
in accepting the [beneficial] replacement of welfare systems 
by market forces. 
• Governance remains accessible and persuasive, rather than 
anonymous and authoritarian: rules are set and enforced not 
by traditional elites, but by elected, meritocratic, rulers. 
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• Global society in this system is rendered compatible with 
nationalism, through being structured by inter-governmental 
regulation and the administration of pluralistic trans-
cultural forces. 
• Global society is preferable to the smothering embrace of 
localised or national multiculturalism. 
• 'Globalization' is eo-terminus with common humanity. 
Hence, the 'common good' of classical inheritance can be 
redefined as realising 'the new individualism' in a world 
context. 
• The 'common evil' is those forces and activities that would 
hinder the attainment or progressive deepening of that new 
individualism. 
In order to understand why a doctrine such as this is so widely 
disputed as it searches for a mass following, we need to 
interrogate the systemic features of its vision. 
In A History of Economic Thought, J.K. Galbraith offers the 
considered view that classical economic theory has been largely 
replaced by a new and different reality, which it captures and 
analyses at best poorly. There are three principal aspects of this 
new reality: 
• Large firms make decisions by a bureaucratic system of 
organisation that brings together many specialised views. 
This supersedes the classical theory of the firm. 
• There is a struggle for dominance between business and the 
state. This has arisen because of 'the dominant, highly 
visible role in the modern economy of the great enterprise 
and its pre-emption in all the advanced industrial states of a 
large share of all production'. 
• Multinational firms do not compete with each other on the 
basis of market prices, but through complex structures of 
controlled supply pricing and market oligopoly. 12 
12Galbriath, A history of economics, pp. 287-8. 
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Within the EU, 'Subsidiarity' and 'Solidarity' have become 
important doctrines in recent years. The contemporary roots of 
these can be traced to Catholic social teaching about the 
corporate (fascist} state and society during the 1930s. Then, the 
Vatican was involved in relaxing its earlier strictures against 
involvement in politics by the ordinary citizen, and was seeking 
limits on the powers that the state might claim vis a vis 'civil 
society'. Both doctrines possess clear roots in theology, and in a 
moral vision of authority. 
Structures and institutions in the EU are being revised to 
tackle a yawning 'democratic deficit'. Soon, the prevailing 
pattern may look very different. Yet what those structures are 
for, and where the limits of their competences lie, are not in any 
serious doubt. Indeed, member states of the EU constantly 
remind Brussels of that. Consequently, powerful and articulate 
champions of the new doctrines are to be found among states, 
within civil societies, and inside EU institutions. This is part of 
the accumulation of nearly half a century of working with 
functional integration. Even so, 'devolution' and 
'harmonisation', synonyms for 'Subsidiarity' and 'Solidarity', 
have developed slowly compared with executive power in 
Brussels. 
These European doctrines are often bolted onto claims about 
'Globalization'. The issues then become whether culturally 
European ideas can be transposed into a global context, and 
where one can locate an accompanying institutional framework. 
The unfulfilled requirement is for nothing less than a 'Meta-
system', an overarching mix of structures and values that will 
subsume, without destabilising, regional systems of national 
states and societies. If this cannot be constructed then elites and 
peoples will tend to opt for local and regional structures in 
preference to yielding up their nations to 'globalization'. 
There is, moreover, something odd about the claim that the 
end of the Cold War has brought an opportunity to 'rebase' the 
norms of individualism, market competition, democracy and 
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civil society in 'globalization'. Why should it be believed that the 
unleashing of new forces of competition alongside suppressed 
needs and wants will lead to a systematic new social contract? 
The example of Russia since the end of the Soviet Union shows 
that 'competition' as Fukuyama, Hayek and others intend it, 
means a culturally and historically embedded understanding of 
'competition'. Or, if it does not, chaos follows. Without time to 
become instantiated, to acquire at least some of the features of 
tradition, an imposed economic transition through 'competition' 
will ipso facto fail. 13 
Much effort has been expended to convince opinion in North 
America and Europe that 'national separatisms', usually former 
Communist dictatorships, threaten the 'Common good'. A 
decade ago it was possible to believe that Milosevic in Serbia 
represented an anachronistic hangover, or that Yeltsin was a 
softer and more tractable version of the same thing. But the 
states that succeeded the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have 
proved avaricious, unstable, and stubbornly particularist. 
And claims that separatist leaders are defending the interests 
of their peoples have grown too numerous to be dismissed. Let 
us now reverse the telescope. Accepting the rules of 'Global 
governance' is about striving for a shared language of political 
and economic stabilisation across the world. Yet nationalist and 
factional leaders face demands by their people for 'justice' in an 
opportunistic world, perhaps against local or regional 
adversaries. On the other hand there are blandishments to. 
liberalise financial markets, widen access to multinationals, 
accept 'international' standards of openness in broadcasting and 
media, and implement Human Rights. Sometimes, as with 
Chechnya and the election of President Putin, the answer seems 
to be a new war. In the most intractable cases, powerful western 
leaders then offer to pay much money, or threaten to use much 
13Rourke, Contemporary globalization, pp. 490-509; Falk, Predatory · 
globalization, pp. 141-6; Lehmann, Putting globalization back on track, pp. 
76-7. 
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force; and end up with 'solutions' to problems that often last no 
longer than it takes for the ink to dry on the agreements they 
. 14 
stgn. 
In such troubled circumstances, inexorably, illegitimate 
governments thrive. In turn, the 'common good' becomes 
confused, apparently being redefined as 'What is good for 
business must be good for all under conditions of 
'globalization'. But in these terms the Russian Mafia has become 
a willing franchisee of 'globalization'. Men and women of good 
character therefore become frustrated and alienated as the 
moving finger of the profit motive abruptly creates 
unemployment and deteriorated conditions of life in the 
developed countries and, is elsewhere associated with illicit 
force, economic and moral corruption, monopolisation, usury, 
and religious bigotry. 
Can Globalisation acquire an ethics of its own? It is betrer to 
suspend the answer to such a broad question. But we must 
proceed under the caution that many leaders in the Middle East 
do not view 'globalization' through the rose-tinted spectacles of 
western liberals. 
14Beyond the comparatively conflict-free geographical bounds of North 
America, Western Europe and Australasia, three continental regions 
associated with democracy and social pluralism, every other major region of 
the world is experiencing on-going civil or international wars or severe 
economic dislocations. See: The 1999 chart of armed conflict published with 
The military balance 1999-2000. 
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Chapter 5 
People and geography 
From the hills above Eilat, Israel's port-resort on the Gulf of 
Aqaba, international boundaries are hardly visible. Yet four 
countries almost meet here. 
A few miles across the sparkling gulf the busy Jordanian port 
of Aqaba handles much of the sanctions-breaking trade to and 
from Iraq. Tourists and others cross between the two towns via 
an official border point, which laboriously issues visas at 
charges that can vary quite mysteriously. The intrepid can travel 
north from Aqaba by bus along the Jordan escarpment - the 
biblical Kings' Highway - to Petra, Amman, even Jerusalem. 
The more comfort-conscious use plentiful battered taxis, driven 
with terrifying alacrity by local Bedouin. 
Several tracks run through the salt marshes at the head of the 
Gulf, which provides feeding grounds for some of the world's 
rarest migrating birds. The careful observer can spot that these 
are sometimes used by swift official-looking vehicles, as well as 
by the sheep and goats of the local peasants. It is an open secret 
on both sides of the frontier that a new international air 
terminal is planned for this location, making use of the good 
existing runway on the Jordanian side to replace the main Eilat 
airport, which is unsuitable for long-haul aircraft. And there are 
plans, too, for tourist ships to use new, shared, port facilities. 
Whereas Eilat is approaching over-development, Aqaba remains 
under-developed. 
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Fewer go south from Aqaba. But it is possible for non-Israelis 
who have obtained the right visas beforehand, and who have 
avoided tell-tale stamps entering their passports whilst in Israel, 
to take the short drive along the eastern side of the Gulf that 
leads to the frontier with Saudi Arabia. Were it open for travel, 
this would be the Darb el-Hajj linking Mecca and Medina with 
the pilgrimage routes to Kadesh, Nakhl, Migdol, Beersheba and 
Jerusalem. Signs are that new business and academic elites in 
Saudi Arabia dare counsel such a course, though officially it 
remains beneath the notice of the ruling regime, at least until 
such time as it is judged that a fair peace has been arrived at 
between Israelis and Palestinians. 
On the opposite side of the Gulf again, a little to the south-
west of Eilat, the road threads its way between silver sands and 
high hills to enter the sleepy border crossing with Egypt at Taba. 
Scene of considerable negotiations between the two countries, 
Taba has its international hotel, Herz and Avis outlets, banks 
and other amenities. From here you can explore the Red Sea 
coast that is becoming 'Egypt's riviera', El-Tur, and the dark 
Sinai mountains that mark the most probable route of the 
biblical Exodus, and the encounters of Moses with the Lord. 
Overlooking Aqaba and Eilat again - in biblical times this 
was Ezion-geber, a place for feeding and watering and resting-
one walks past now disused anti-aircraft missile emplacements 
to look at the road built for tanks which runs uphill to another, 
but little used, official crossing point with Egypt; and musingly 
observes Palestinians from Gaza, who by this route 'get away 
from it all' without attracting attention. 
Future economic development of this region would require 
massive infrastructure development, including a fast mass-transit 
overland route linking Upper Egypt, Gaza, and Tel-
Aviv/Jerusalem to the Gulf. Beersheba - a modern Arab 
settlement in an ancient Hebrew place - stands at the juncture 
of the most likely routes. Nor should one forget the Hejaz 
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railway, built by the British, that once linked Medina to 
Jerusalem. 
In the here and now, as in Biblical times, the geography 
people want to behave by is beginning to matter more than the 
geography of frontiers and regimes. So here and now, around 
the Gulf, people are mixing and talking and bargaining in ways 
that are still much more difficult to the north, across the desert 
and the mountains, in the maelstrom of conflicting claims, 
above all in Jerusalem. 
There, the contrast could not be starker. West Jerusalem has 
become a large, modern, exclusively Jewish city. Palestinians 
(mainly Christians) and others who owned properties before 
1948 left, and after 1967 poorer Palestinians retreated to a few 
suburban Arab enclaves. East Jerusalem has the opposite 
character. Here, Jews live in settlements, whether ancient or 
modern, but the culture of the heart of this part of the city is 
Arab. Each half of the city has its own bus station, orie 
connecting intimately with Israel, the other badly, with frequent 
breakdowns and security checks, to the Palestinian cities of 
Ramallah and Hebron, and to the Arab towns and villages of 
Bethlehem, Zariyah, Abu Dis, a! Ram, Kalandia and Kufr Aka b. 
Within East Jerusalem lies the Old City, crucible of three 
world religions. 
For Judaism, Temple Mount is the summation of everything 
God covenanted with his chosen people. The remains of the 
Western wall of the Second Temple are a site of the utmost 
reverence, the tangible location in prayer of the scriptural 
tradition. The Jewish cemetery beyond the eastern wall of the 
Old City also speaks uniquely to the Jewish people: to 'spin in 
your grave' means that your soul is seeking this place. For most 
if not all of the ultra Orthodox communities that live here, 
political Zionism is a deplorable though conceivably necessary 
means to the recovery of Eretz Israel, the Promised Land. It is 
unthinkable that the State of Israel, which accords Rabbinic 
authority to the Orthodox, should rescind its 1980 Annexation 
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of Jerusalem. There can be no meaningful division of the City, 
or sharing of sovereignty. 
For Islam, the Prophet's bodily ascent into Heaven is 
identified here. Almost continuously since the time of Saluhadin, 
Jerusalem has been a city under Islamic authority. Hence two of 
the greatest Mosques, the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa, 
occupy the space where the Temple once stood. Although King 
Hussein gave up Jordan's claim to sovereignty over East 
Jerusalem and the West Bank, he gifted a fortune to the entire 
re-gilding of the Dome of the Rock, which proudly gleams its 
Islamic semaphore over all the occupying activities around. 
Today, Arafat and his Palestinian counsellors are on the horns 
of a dilemma. Israel would concede more territorial and political 
coherence to Palestine if its capital were Hebron, or better still 
Gaza. But Arafat is a Husseini. His life was about implacable 
armed resistance to Israel. Temperamentally, and to preserve 
overarching authority, he must cleave to religious and historic 
claims whose realisation, in any foreseeable conditions, could 
never amount to more than a shadow of once great substance. 
For Christians the Old City of Jerusalem is the place where 
Jesus of Nazareth brought his followers to symbolically 
challenge Roman rule; and was betrayed, tried and executed, the 
divine victim of human fallibility. Most biblical references to the 
burial and resurrection of Jesus are also located in Jerusalem. 
The Church of the Holy Sepulchre inside the Old City 
symbolises Christian unity and typifies Christian disunity. 
Beneath its Dome, Russian, Greek, Syriac, Uniate and Coptic 
Christians, whose presence is in a sense unbroken through the 
millennia, vie with the smarter, more numerous, presence of the 
Vatican and other Catholic Orders. Other Christian 
denominations, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Church of England, 
cluster around the Old City, or outside its Ottoman walls in 
East Jerusalem, or around the Church of St Andrew. Christian 
pilgrims come here in vast droves from the rich societies ohhe 
west. Pope John Paul II visited Jerusalem in April 2000. This 
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both codified a rapprochement between the Catholic church and 
Israel which has led to recognition and a half-apology for not 
denouncing the Holocaust, and endorsed the need for a 
Palestinian state, with particular favour towards the role of 
Christian Palestinians. The Pope has also proposed that 
Jerusalem should have a new international status, neutralised 
under the auspices of the UN. 
In this pivotal city the geography that matters is existential, 
inside the head and the heart rather than on the ground. So, 
unlike Eilat, where clear boundaries are easily permeated, in 
Jerusalem the boundaries that matter may be undetectable by 
empirical methods, but are razor sharp in the diametrically 
opposed views of the protagonists.15 
15Baskin, The conflict will end in Jerusalem'; lnbar, Jerusalem: the forgotten 
fortress; Joffe, MERIA guide to Jerusalem'; Mostyn, Time bomb under 
Jerusalem; Prior, The Bible a11d colottialism; Sacks, Diving the art of double 
vision. Israeli Uewish), Euro-American (Christian) and Palestinian (Islamic 
and Christian) viewpoints on Jerusalem can be found online: 
http://www.virtualjerusalem.com/channels/news/issues/jerusalem/jerusalem.h 
tm; http://www.susqu.edu/history/medtrav/jerusalern!default.htm; 
http://www.jerusalem.muni.iVenglishl; http://www.israel-
mfa.gov.il!mfa/go.asp?MF AHOcnnO>; 
http://www.thebook.com/papax7/jerusl15.htm; 
http://www.holylandnetwork.com/jerusalem/history.htm>; 
http://www.pna.org/mininfo/jerusalem/jerusal.htm; 
http://www.passia.org/jerusalem/publications/ReligiousAspectsText.htm; 
http://www.interx-me.com/jerusalem/jerusalem.htm; http://www.al-
bushra.org/jerus!I_pray.htm; http://www.ipcri.org/. 
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Chapter 6 
Regimes 
Arab and Islamic countries in the Middle East are typically 
governed either by traditional ruling families, or by post-
revolutionary nationalist regimes that depend on the military. 
Both types of regime tend to be elitist, inefficient, corrupt, and 
opposed to free-markets. Hence economic performance is 
inefficient. Entrepreneurial talents and competition are 
discouraged. Citizenship is restricted. Political participation is 
limited. There is no free exchange of ideas. The governing 
classes exploit as their personal fiefdoms resources which belong 
in law to the whole people. 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and the Gulf States, including 
Abu Dhabi, conform to the traditional pattern of rule. In these 
countries, citizens are subjected to social codes .that require 
conformity in exchange for economic inclusion. This results in 
the partial distribution of wealth through welfare programmes, 
education, housing, etc., all of which are free. In general, citizens 
pay no or few taxes. The burden of employment falls upon an 
underclass of imported or 'foreign' labour. In the region, several 
million people fall into this 'underclass'; they have a status little 
different than serfs. They do not enjoy citizenship, or 
independent personal and economic entitlements. Foreign 
professionals fill many technical jobs in these countries. Such 
individuals work on more clearly defined short-term contracts, 
and have a higher social status with more legal rights. But in 
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many cases service is being provided to the host government: 
foreign contractors or governments assign workers to these 
posts, and are often responsible for their terms of engagement. 
Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Libya conform to the 
revolutionary council form of regime. In these countries, 
ordinary citizens are subjected to social and employment rules 
that sub-serve the economic aims of the state. This means that 
patronage, or at least considerable time-serving, is required 
before an adequate job can be secured. The state runs most large 
enterprises, and thus acts as the main employer. 
For both types of regime, major functions of the regime in the 
economy include: 
• defining commercial law 
• controlling banking and foreign exchange 
• acting as the main channel of commercial lending 
• taking a controlling stake in major joint-ventures with 
foreign-owned firms 
• prescribing rules where independent capital-raising stock 
markets exist. 16 
Turkey does not fall neatly into either of these two categories. 
Its constitution commits it to secular democracy, though the 
military is charged with upholding the constitution, and has 
intervened several times to suspend civilian rule. Democratic 
rule has been operating without interruption since the mid-
1980s, albeit currently with comparatively unstable coalition 
governments. Turkey is a member of NATO, a strong ally of the 
US, and has defence Treaties with Israel and Jordan. The EU has 
been considering Turkey's credentials for membership, and has 
negotiated a full Customs Union. This means that Turkish 
labour and goods are able to circulate freely within the Single 
European Market. Turkey strongly endorses the Oslo accords, 
16Brooks, Political-military relations and the stability of Arab regimes, pp. 
20-35. 
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and ignores the formal and informal trade boycotts most Islamic 
countries maintain against Israel. 
At the same time, traditionalism prevails in religion and 
society, based on Sunni Islamic values and the old Ottoman 
system of circulating elites. The revolutionary council aspects of 
Turkey's regime come through its guardianship of the 
constitution, and the capacity of the military to ignore or 
override elected politicians in foreign and defence policy. Strong 
and persistent criticisms have been levelled at its Human Rights 
record, especially over ruthless military suppression of parties 
and movements supporting Kurdish independence. Islamic 
parties are strong, hold the balance in the legislature, and may 
lose patience with a political system that denies them access to 
the full and ultimate power. The military, secular parties, and 
professional elites have combined to oppose extremism, and to 
subject the leadership of Islamic parties to democratic 
conventions. This is crucial if a repetition of the politics that 
affected Turkey following the Islamic revolution in Iran is to be 
avoided. During that period Turkey's elites imposed military 
government on the country, while the political system was 
'cleansed' of fundamentalists. A recurrence of that pattern might 
fatally affect Turkey's integration into the EU and the broader 
west. Even more importantly, however, it could transform 
Turkey into an Islamic republic whose primary alignment would 
not be the western powers, but with the Arab world and lran.17 
Especial attention is required for Iran, because it exercises 
formidable religious and ideological influence throughout the 
Middle East. Formerly within Britain's sphere of influence, it 
was one of the first sources of the supply of oil. Following the 
Second World War, and the displacement of British power, Iran 
became a client of the US. The Americans rapidly developed 
Iran's industrial potential and oil wealth, and relied upon an 
authoritarian regime and a wealthy bourgeoisie to preserve 
17Halliday, Nation and religion in the Middle East; Zahlan, The making of 
the modern Gulf States. 
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power. Following the October war, the Shah's regime became 
policeman of the Gulf, equipped with the most sophisticated US· 
military capabilities. Yet Iran possessed an articulate and restless 
working class, through which an active communist resistance 
sought revolution. At the same time a sophisticated clergy, 
within the country and in emigration, preserved and cultivated 
fundamentalist Shiism. 18 
Flagrant materialism, lack of legitimacy and ruthless secret 
police methods led to an unstable coalition of these opposing 
forces. The Shah was toppled. President Carter contemplated a 
counter coup and military intervention. From the ensuing 
bloody disorder there emerged a radical conservative religious 
government under Ayatollah Khomeini, which systematically 
extirpated all secular influences. Over two decades, and through 
the protracted bloodletting of an eight year war with Iraq, that 
regime has entrenched itself as a dedicated opponent of 
'western', and above all American and Israeli, interests. Through 
time the initial spasm of revolutionary religious ideology has 
shifted in focus, away from the enduring structures of an 
essentially un-Islamic international system, towards the world of 
Islam itself. Most notably in Lebanon, whose Shia minority 
population has acquired equality with Sunni and Christian 
communities, Hizbollah ('The party of God') has turned into a 
political movement willing to contend for influence within a 
national framework. Iranian scholars, engineers, scientists and 
business people, still controlled by a religious autocracy, have 
won back the right to study and speak with some independence, 
and on equal terms to their peers in the west and in other 
countries. What appears to be developing is a new synthesis 
between religious and secular values, and a resurgence of 
Iranian national power on terms of reluctant coexistence with 
the prevailing international order. 
When we turn to Israel, there are some strong similarities 
between it and the prevailing pattern of regional regimes. 
111 Ansari, Iran, Islam and democracy. 
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Citizenship is defined primarily through religious status, which 
in turn is determined by Rabbinic laws enshrined in the 
constitution. These laws also proscribe legal marriages, claims to 
citizenship, and, consequently, primary property and civic 
rights. This also directly explains the special additional 
privileges that attach to religious parties and the Ultra-
Orthodox. Shas, a nominally religious party, has built up a 
formidable economic power base. Its former leader, Ari Deriya, 
is serving a term in prison for corruption. Around 900,000 of a 
population of six million are non-Jewish citizens who have, in 
theory, equal civil and political rights. But this mainly 
Palestinian and Arab population does not enjoy equality of 
opportunity in education, social provision, or employment. In 
some areas this prejudice also applies to Sephardi Jews. 
On the other hand there are radical differences between Israel 
and all other regimes. Israel is an open society and a democracy, 
in which freedom of opinion is guaranteed by an electoral 
system, legislature and judiciary having independence from 
executive control. Minorities are politically organised and 
represented. Civil society in Israel is strongly secular. 
Compulsory military service is increasingly resisted. Relations 
with neighbouring countries are constantly debated. The Oslo 
Accords are passionately supported, or opposed. This trend has 
been reinforced by a large recent immigration of Jews from 
Russia and central Europe. A further element in the population 
is 'guest workers', allowed to work in Israel because of skill 
shortages. The official estimate is 300,000, but unofficial 
estimates are at least double. Formerly, many of these 'guest 
workers' were Palestinians from Gaza or the West Bank." 
19The former dependence of Israel's economy on Palestinian labour has been 
declining rapidly. Initially this was due to a combination of the first 
Palestinian Intifada and the mass exodus of Jews from Russia and other 
countries in the former Soviet bloc. But during the Oslo process restrictions 
on Palestinians remained. The rising demand for labour in Israel was met by 
importing workers from many parts of the world, including South and East 
Asia. Since the beginning of the seco~d lntifada, these restrictions have been 
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The Palestinians, en route to statehood, are also different, and 
caught between these different types. Palestinian leadership of 
the PLO possesses features akin to the Revolutionary Council 
type of Arab regime. But Palestinian leadership under Israeli 
occupation, in Gaza and the West Bank, absorbed and imitated 
methods of democracy from the west, and indeed from the 
Israelis. Furthermore, Palestine has its own Diaspora; 
businessmen and intellectuals living abroad in exile, whose role 
will be important in the economic development of an 
independent state. 20 
Yet another regime that is (potentially) different to the Arab-
Israeli polarity can be found in Lebanon. The long-standing 
Lebanese pattern is one of factions dominating the social 
structure, with 'confessionalism' prevailing in political 
institutions: Christians, Sunni and Shiia share representation in 
roles and in the bureaucracy. This formula gave rise to many 
difficulties, due to underlying demographic and economic 
changes, and to increasingly polarised responses to the 
burgeoning of Palestinian refugee camps and their politicisation 
following the June war of 1967. Civil war broke out in 1975. 
Since Israel's disastrous military intervention in 1982, Lebanon 
has been subjected to rule from Damascus. But Syrian 
domination has created long-term difficulties for the Syrian 
regime, and intractable difficulties within Lebanon. Under Asad, 
several limited experiments in returning autonomy to Lebanese 
tightened much further. The consequences for the Palestinian economy and 
society have been dire. Amira Hass in Drinking the sea at Gaza has written 
·vividly about this, and its political repercussions in Palestinian hatred and 
bitterness against Israel. 
2
°Considerable efforts have gone into assisting the future development of 
Palestinian society: Macdonald, The significance of civil society and T amari, 
Governance, civil society and state building. Yet the outlook for both 
internal stability and the 'peace process' seem quite bleak. Usher, Dispatches 
from Palestine; Hass, Drinking the sea at Gaza. Actual and potential 
divisions between the existing leadership of the Palestinians, Palestinian 
society and the bnigrC Palestinian bourgeoisie are such that The World 
Bank has chosen Arthur Andersen to attract business people back to 
Palestine: http://www.aapepp.com/. " 
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political institutions were frustrated, in pa~t becau~e of the 
occupation of southern Lebanon by Israel. With the Withdrawal 
of Israel and the death of Asad, elections in Lebanon in 
September 2000 unexpectedly returned the billionaire Lebanese 
politician Rafiq Hariri to power, and brought the defeat of 
Syria's proxy government led by Salim Hoss.21 
The table provides a 'baseline' statistical profile of what is 
being termed 'regimes'; that is, states and societies in 
association. 
It shows that in absolute terms Turkey has the largest GDP, 
but that in GDP per capita Israel is far ahead of any other 
country. For all Israel's momentum of economic development, 
however, its society is dwarfed, and increasingly being left 
behind, by demographic growth. This is not seriously challenged 
by recent large-scale immigration to Israel, though that factor 
has considerable political significance. Some comparatively un-
developed Arab regimes enjoy great wealth, notably Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and UAE. Other Middle East regimes, notably 
Turkey, Iran and Egypt, enjoy formidable military strength. It is 
crucial to note that none of these three societies is fully 'Arab', 
and that in the case of Iran there is intense religious rivalry. Iran 
and Iraq have large debt burdens due to war, though Iraq's 
position is clearly worse. Turkey has borrowed heavily to fund 
industrialisation. There is no accurate published data on the 
aggregate overseas investments of the region's regimes, but these 
far outweigh its debt burden, making the region an exporter of 
vast amounts of capital.22 
The social geography of this interface between states and 
societies underpins all differences, ranging from the highly 
conservative traditionalism of Saudi Arabia, to the pulsating 
21For instance see Al-bawaba 4 September 2000: 
http://www.albawaba.com!fheNewslhtm/. 
22The table shows a total external debt for the region in 1997 terms at 
around $345 bn. This may be an under-estimate. Even so, however, the 
region's total debt may be less than the accumulated overseas investments of 
just one OPEC country, Kuwait. 
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expectancy of Palestine. In all cases we find a gradual 
'pluralisation' of societies and economies, which is exercising 
pressures for change and response on governing regimes. Many 
of these forces of change come from long-term structural 
changes in economies and demographic patterns, or from 
Globalisation and other trans-national influences. 
Thus, when the focus is shifted to 'domestic' or internal 
features of state and society, the picture of two variants of 
authoritarianism on the Arab and Islamic side, with Israel and 
one or two partially democratised Middle East states on the 
other, gives way to a more variegated picture. This is also true if 
one examines Cyprus, or if one extends the analysis of Arab and 
Islamic states from the Mashraq to the Maghreb. But these 
extensions are beyond the geopolitical focus of this paper. 
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Chapter 7 
Resources 
The Middle East has undergone massive economic change since 
the Second World War. But development has been uneven, and 
in some respects distorted. There is a deep divide between 
countries that have major oil production, and those that do not. 
On the other hand, conflicts, especially between Israel and the 
Arab states, have contributed to a lack of integrated regional 
infrastructure, and to the trade-creating and trade-diverting 
effects of customs' barriers, embargos, and privileged trade and 
technology flows, including flows of foreign aid. 
Within these parametric conditions, the region remains 
heavily reliant on agriculture as its chief employment-generating 
activity. There is a gulf separating Sudan, where over 80% of 
the active population is engaged in agriculture, and Israel, where 
4% is the comparative number. Even in economies where 
industry and/or services have grown rapidly, typically 30-50% 
of the workforce is in agriculture. In turn this means that 
agricultural exports remain an important source of foreign 
exchange earnings. For a few countries, notably Sudan, Palestine 
and Syria, agriculture remains the most important contributor 
to GDP. For another ten countries, however, the proportion is 
under ten per cent of GDP. Iran and Egypt, large and important 
economies, generate around 20-30% of GDP from agriculture 
or food processing. Nonetheless, this picture indicates a 
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'westernising' pattern of development, in which agriculture is 
giving way to industry and the services sector.23 
Aside from oil extraction and its associated pipelines, the 
heavy industrial structure of the region is concentrated in a few 
countries: Israel, Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Iraq. Typically, these 
concentrations are located close to sea outlets and/or large 
rivers. The main activities include petrochemicals, power 
generation, shipbuilding, machine building, cement, and 
transportation. The Gulf and Saudi Arabia have much smaller 
concentrations of such activities. Vast stretches of the 
geographical core of the region have no major industries. 
Light industry is more widespread, and is heavily oriented to 
textiles: carpet making, weaving. Mining or mineral extraction 
is important in some countries, including Iran, Turkey, Egypt, 
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. All of these countries have 
important mineral deposits, in some cases heavily exploited 
though in others not, ranging from chromium and zinc to salt, 
coal and gold. Desalination of water, and its association with 
new agricultural technologies and food processing, is important 
in Israel, Saudi Arabia and parts of the Gnlf. 
While numerous countries have taken ownership over the 
industrial extraction and transportation of oil and gas, and 
some have built up large 'downstream' petrochemical 
complexes, most of the region's oil and gas is transported 
directly overseas for refining. Hence, port facilities are crucial 
along the Arab and Persian Gulfs, and along the Mediterranean 
littoral. Many of the more recently exploited reserves of gas and 
oil are located offshore, in the Gulf or the Mediterranean, 
though these fields tend to be smaller than the super-giant 
onshore fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran.24 
General industrial development in Iran and Iraq has been. 
heavily constrained by war and sanctions. If once these 
constraints are fully lifted, vast industrial reconstruction projects 
23Anderson, The Middle East, pp. 166-82. 
"Ibid., pp. 82-9, 182-93. 
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will get underway. The main beneficiaries of such projects, 
many of which are in a planning or project development phase, 
include Russia and China. These two countries, together with 
France, are most heavily engaged in support of nuclear 
engineering in the region. 
Tourism provides a kind of industrial overlap with the 
evolving services sector of the Middle East regional economy. 
Most countries have developed a national (or sub-regional) 
airline. In association with the ultra-modern office and road 
complexes of the most developed parts of the region, this 
provides a series of business and tourism 'hubs'. That said, only 
Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon and Dubai have made 
consistent efforts to develop the potential of tourism. In some 
cases, notably Lebanon, Israel and Egypt, these efforts have 
been limited or destroyed by violence. In other countries, such as 
Jordan, lack of infrastructure is the main impediment. Yet 
others, however, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, restrict or 
discourage tourism. In Iraq, Iran and Libya, sanctions imposed 
by the US or UN have also impacted tourism development. As 
Lebanon recovers from civil war, and searches for renewed 
independence, it may challenge the Gulf states, particularly 
Bahrain and Dubai, as the regional hub for business services. 
The region's vast potential for developing tourism, and more 
generally the services sector of its economies, relies ultimately on 
the attainment of political stability and social openness. But 
there are also economic blockages in the way. Two of these are 
lack of water resources and lack of commercial infrastructure. 
Agriculture accounts for an estimated 70% of water usage. 
Yet much of the region is water deficient for agricultural 
development. At the same time, urbanisation, which is occurring 
rapidly in many countries, exponentially increases the demand 
for water. Population in the region is also rapidly increasing. On 
top of this, any large-scale increase in 'temporary' populations, 
such as tourism brings, would multiply demand further. This 
problem can be diminished by the construction of aquifers, 
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exploiting deep underground sources, desalination projects, 
recycling waste water, conservation schemes, price and/or 
priority allocations, and by importing water to the region. But 
all of the foregoing methods are limited in scope because of 
underlying technology and running costs, or water security 
issues. 
Hence, all other measures aside, there is no peaceful 
alternative to riparian countries entering into comprehensive, 
long term, collaboration. This applies to all of the three major 
river systems in the region: the Nile, Tigris/Euphrates, and 
Jordan. These are shown on the maps. 
Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia share the Nile. Ethiopia controls 
the most important headwaters, but Egypt is both the main user 
and the most powerful of the three states. The Tigris/Euphrates 
is controlled by Turkey, and shared by Syria and Iraq. Turkey is 
completing a vast dam project, which will resource its future 
industrial and agricultural development. Syria and Iraq have 
exhibited insecurities over this, but are in no position to act 
effectively. The Jordan system is both the smallest in the region, 
and the one involving the largest number of riparian states: 
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Palestine. 
The politics of this is central to the Oslo peace process, and to 
relations between Israel and Syria. Adding industrial and 
demographic growth to the inherent limits of the system itself 
means that 'hydropolitics' have become a specific and probably 
permanent type of geopolitics in this part of the region. 
Hydropolitics might be crucial to future peace or war, and has 
been a sub-theme of Israel's occupation strategies on the West 
Bank and Golan, and in Lebanon.25 
Geographical features also necessitate trans-national 
collaboration in commercial infrastructure development for 
most countries in the region. For example, Turkey's excess 
supply position with water is partly offset by its requirement for 
imported oil products. All countries except Israel have a relative 
"Ibid., pp. 72-82, 286-96; Latter (ed.), The Middle East, p. 7. 
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deficiency in electricity generation, and can gain from a shared 
transmission network. The tourist potential of the Jordan 
Valley, Syria, Palestine and Egypt can only be tapped effectively 
if there is a regional road/rail network that links Egypt, Gaza, 
Palestine, Jordan and Israel. The rationale for water sharing has 
already been addressed. In turn, these types of collaboration 
would alter the cost/benefit calculus of desalination projects. 
Infrastructure development requires capitalisation and 
technological expertise. Middle East countries have massive 
accumulated overseas investments, but also tend to run current 
account deficits. Rather than repatriating those overseas 
holdings, the most favoured methods of financing commercial 
infrastructure development would entail FDI in commercially 
attractive projects, underpinned in high priority cases by World 
Bank or IMF loans and guarantees. This in turn entails an 
infrastructure of commercial financial markets, banks and 
project services' groups, such as specialist contractors, engineers 
and surveyors. 
Here, separately and beyond the Arab-Israeli peace process, 
turns the key geopolitical issue of whether, and if so on what 
terms, regional regimes and societies will accept 'alien' measures 
of governance. The demand for these has been expressed as 
follows: 
Effective and honest public sector institutions; legal, fiscal and 
economic arrangements which are conducive to encouraging 
FDI; open, fair and accountable government; the functioning 
of open media; the provision of effective education, health 
care and other public services.26 
Furthermore, within the daunting set of requirements generated 
by 'Globalisation' comes the particularly difficult issue of 
Israel's comparative advantages. These include absolute 
advantages m such areas as large-scale engmeermg, 
"Latter, The Middle East, p. 3. 
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construction, power generation and commercial banking; and 
relative advantages in such areas as skilled labour. Unavoidably 
no Arab or Islamic regime is willing to make peace with Israel 
over the occupied territories and Palestine, only to see Israelis 
capturing the commanding heights of a new regional economy. 
The Middle East provides the largest supply of oil to world 
markets, and possesses the largest reserves of natural gas, which 
is increasingly important as an export. Its reserves of both are 
crucial to the world economy, particularly to western Europe, 
Japan and East Asia. That said, in 1997-98 eight OPEC 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (including 
Algeria) produced somewhat less than 30% of world oil 
production and under 10% of natural gas production. This 
compares with their sovereign title to 66% of proven reserves of 
oil and about 35% of proven reserves of gas.27 
Control over such high proportions of strategically vital raw 
materials has given oil-rich Middle East states a vast stake in the 
assets and financial markets of the developed world. For 
instance Abu Dhabi, leader of the UAE, has estimated 
investments of $350 billion, and oil reserves amounting to about 
4% of proven world totals. Although it is impossible to 
extrapolate with accuracy from one example, an order of 
magnitude correlation probably obtains. Saudi Arabia, with 
28% of world reserves, might have overseas investments of 
some $2,500 billion. Such societies and their leaders have 
become rich beyond their own traditional expectations. 
The obverse of this control and financial power is the 
industrial and financial vulnerability of the developed world 
economies. The US consumes around 25% of world oil 
production, and draws around 10% of total Middle East 
production. Japan and western Europe are still more dependent; 
drawing around 25% each of total exports from the region. The 
long-term outlook is that this dependency on the Middle East 
27 Anderson, The Middle East, pp. 182-91. 
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will increase, as reserves elsewhere are depleted more rapidly 
than reserves within the region.28 
Of course financial power is not the same as control. The 
sequestration of Iranian assets by the US, and the imposition of 
a strangling UN sanctions regime on Iraq, demonstrate that the 
western powers are better able to eat their cake and still have it 
than are the technology and security dependent oil-producers. 
Since Iraq's failed attempt to annex Kuwait, intimidate Saudi 
Arabia, and resume its struggle with Iran, US and British 
military forces have been based in the region. Still, the balance 
between stability and instability remains critical, and is not 
ultimately a matter of military power. The October War of 
1973, the Iranian revolution of 1979, and the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 exemplify how unpredictably it can be upset. 
The other side of the coin is that conflict and instability 
directly impact not only the supply but also the demand and 
hence the revenues derived from the trade in oil. Moreover, high 
oil prices such as those prevailing between the mid-1970s and 
mid-1980s brought about a pattern of spending within the 
region that was driven by government demand. For example, 
Saudi Arabia earns over 90% of its export revenues from oil, 
and this supports around 80% of government spending. When 
oil prices fell after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and slumped 
during the 1990s following the Gulf War, the economies of 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf entered recession. Ironical as 
it might seem, the effect was unemployment. While the brunt of 
this recession fell on 'imported' labour, particularly Palestinians, 
the employment prospects and incomes of (younger) Saudis, 
Kuwaitis and others were severely diminished. Hence, even as 
the 'swing' producer within OPEC, committed to stabilising the 
global oil trade, Saudi Arabia (as other OPEC countries) has 
been running a cumulative balance of payments deficit. This has 
28Ibid., pp. 284-8. 
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resulted in a sense of social and economic crisis within the 
Kingdom.29 
An underlying cause of this propensity to economic and social 
crisis is that intra-regional trade in the Middle East lags sadly 
behind that of every other region in the world economy. Exports 
and imports beyond the region comprise 96% by value of the 
aggregate visible trade balance for all countries. Much of this 
external trade is in arms. Latest estimates suggest the region 
spent an aggregate $65bn on defence during 1998. This is 
tantamount to a geopolitical deformity. The region possesses a 
strong body, constituted by the value of its mono-economic oil 
resource. But its limbs, comprising the pattern of economic 
activities described above, are severely under-developed, except 
in military capability. 
This brings us to a geopolitical paradox, which is liable to 
resist being solved for many years to come. The oil trade is, pre-
eminently, the global industry. Yet it has obviated balanced 
regional development for most Arab and Islamic countries. This 
reinforces both traditional and revolutionary regime structures, 
which have been enabled to prosecute an interminable 
confrontation with Israel, and thereby resist the message carried 
by the creed of 'Globalization'. 
Hence the geopolitics of the Middle East suggest that the 
more things change, the more they will tend to remain the same. 
2~Yamani, Changed identities, pp. 15-22; Mai Yamani, 'Awakening' in The 
World Today, pp. 21-2; 1155, 'Saudi Arabia's royal council'. For an 
important more general account of the economic consequences of war and 
crisis in the region, see Mofid & Ehteshami, The economic consequences of 
the Gulf war. 
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Chapter 8 
Weapons of mass destruction 
Conflicts in the Middle East have long encouraged the spread 
and use of weapons of mass destruction. Israel acquired an 
operational nuclear capability in the 1960s, having been assisted 
to develop the necessary technologies first by France and then 
the US. Iraq came close to achieving an initial nuclear capability 
in the 1980s, and has also pursued, and used, chemical and 
biological warfare capabilities. Under UN sanctions for ten 
years these capabilities have been stringently limited, though the 
expertise to resume development has been retained. Iran is 
developing a range of operational missiles, and is presumed to 
be acquiring nuclear weapons. It has also used chemical 
weapons. Egypt has developed indigenous capabilities, but has 
not proceeded to operational deployments. Syria was assisted by 
the Soviet Union to acquire a number of missile systems, and is 
pursuing WMD options. Libya is a broadly similar case. Saudi 
Arabia has purchased Chinese missiles, and may have WMD 
warheads on its territory under the control of foreign 
technicians. Certain of the Gulf states have shown interest in 
acquiring warheads and delivery systems. Although not regional 
states by any of the usual geographical criteria, India and 
Pakistan have delivery systems that may soon reach into the 
region. The same is true in reverse for Israel and perhaps Iran. 
All five nuclear great powers - the US, Russia, Britain, France 
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and China - have systems that could be used in regional 
conflicts. 
Until recently the perspective of the western powers stipulated 
that this situation was to be treated as 'abnormal', requiring 
containment through non-proliferation strategies and an 
elaborate edifice of treaties backed by general international law. 
It is therefore worth testing that approach against the 'real 
world' legal and constitutional position of strategic arms 
limitations and non-proliferation. 
International agreements limiting nuclear weapons include 
START and the ABM Treaty. These were negotiated by the US 
and USSR. Russia has agreed to be bound as successor to the 
Soviet Union, and other countries formerly part of the USSR, 
including Kazakhstan and Ukraine, respect START provisions. 
Even so, progress in implementing START provisions has been 
slow. The ICBM of historical imagery is no longer the likeliest 
vehicle for the delivery of WMD. The 'War of the cities' during 
the Iran-Iraq war, and Saddam Hussein's use of 'Scud' missiles 
against Israel in 1991 - albeit with conventional warheads -
demonstrated that short and medium-range SSM are far more 
likely to be used in anger. For that reason, the ABM Treaty is 
being undermined by the development of new technologies, and 
US programmes aimed at the deployment of NMD. The US, 
Russia, China, Israel and countries in the EU are all working on 
a variety of possible TMD systems, which if fully deployed 
would render the ABM Treaty null and void. 
What then are the other legal constraints that limit 
proliferation of WMD? 
In the field of nuclear non-proliferation the principal 
agreements are the NNPT {1970) and the CTBT {not yet.in 
force). Signatory states of the NNPT - numbering 186 as of 
mid-1997 - promise not to develop nuclear weapons, and 
undertake to let their nuclear facilities be inspected by the IAEA. 
In exchange for this they are promised extensive technical 
GEOPOLITICS AND MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 61 
assistance with the development of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes. 
The US Senate rejected ratification of CTBT in 1999, partly in 
view of nuclear testing by India and Pakistan during 1998, and 
extensive espionage by China reported to the Senate during 
1999. This rejection signals a sea change in expectations about 
WMD limitation agreements, a loss of confidence in non-
proliferation methodologies, and a willingness to bet on 
expensive and incompletely proven national technical means for 
strategic defence and missile-launch detection. In turn this 
seeming movement toward superpower unilateralism will 
encourage Russia, China, India, Iran and other countries to look 
to their own missile defence requirements. 30 
Chemical weapons are covered by the ewe {1997), which 
aims to eliminate all chemical weapons' stockpiles. The ewe 
has entered into force. Signatories - over 130 as of 1999 -
commit themselves to an intrusive inspection regime overseen by 
the OPew. Large stocks of chemical weapons are being 
destroyed, subject to OPew inspection and verification, by the 
US, Russia, Britain etc. The US attached reservations to ewe 
verification of some 'dual use' facilities at the time of Senate 
ratification, and these are likely to be followed by other 
signatories. 
Biological weapons are to be covered by a BTWC, which is 
still drafting a protocol for verification and confidence building. 
Existing prohibitions rest with the BWC {1972), negotiated at 
Geneva. There have been many developments in microbiological 
and chemical warfare technologies in the meantime. The 
existing convention is by now an empty shell, and lacks .a 
verification regime. 
The Missile Technology Control Regime is a club of countries 
committed to controlling proliferation of missile control 
30 An online source for both the CfBT and the history of nuclear arms 
control can be found at: 
http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/ctch4050.htm. 
62 FORSVARSSTUDIER 6/2002 
technologies. Specifically, it seeks to control technologies and 
production facilities that would enable the delivery of significant 
payloads over more than 300km. There are 32 signatories, 
including the US, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, Canada, 
Japan, Ukraine, Sweden, Switzerland and other countries with 
experience in developing guidance and control systems for 
missiles and aircraft. China, India and Israel are not signatories, 
but have undertaken to implement MTCR limitations. 
Important transfers of restricted technologies have occurred 
between members, from members to non-signatories, and from 
countries promising to abide by the regime to others. Transfers 
alleged to be in breach of MTCR include: France and UAE; 
Ukraine and China; Russia and China, Iraq, and Iran; China 
and Pakistan and Iran. North Korea, which is not a member of 
the group, has allegedly transferred technologies to Egypt, 
Pakistan, Iran, Syria and Vietnam. In the Middle East and South 
Asia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, UAE, Iran, Pakistan and India have all 
been involved in trade in MTCR restricted technologies. Israel is 
currently in dispute with the US over the proposed transfer to 
China of air-to-air phased array radar technology. 
All of that said, the international regime of non-proliferation 
agreements has proved both susceptible to circumvention, and 
beyond enforcement. At least 35 countries aside from the great 
powers have short-range SSM systems. Ten countries have 
acquired systems with ranges over 1,000 km, though not all 
have moved to, or retained, operational capability. In the 
Middle East two countries best demonstrate the problematic this 
presents. 31 
Israel has refused to sign the NNPT, CTBT or MTCR, and in 
exchange for understandings not to 'advertise' its deterrent, has 
not been pressed by the US or other western powers to submit 
to international controls. This Israeli 'exceptionalism' has 
proved a continual goad to the Arab states. It is too late for the 
US to reverse Israel's nuclear and WMD developments. But it is 
31IISS, The military balance 1999-1998, pp. 285-92. 
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increasingly incredible to leave Israel outside arrangements it 
will not voluntarily join, without acknowledging the precedent 
this establishes. 
Iraq is a signatory of the NNPT, yet circumvented IAEA 
safeguards (as have several other signatory states) so as to divert 
nuclear materials into its clandestine weapons' programme. Iraq 
signed the BWC, but never ratified the agreement. Iraq also 
subscribed to the 1989 Paris Declaration reaffirming the validity 
of the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of CBW. None the 
less, it used chemical weapons during its war with Iran, and 
against internal Kurdish rebellions. These violations have been 
condemned by UNHCR and world opinion. Until 1995 Iraq 
denied having developed biological weapons. But following the 
testimony of a number of defectors, it admitted having a well-
established biological weapons programme. Since that time 
biological as much or more than nuclear issues have been at the 
heart of Iraq's disputes with the international community over 
the lifting of sanctions. 
What then of law and sanctions as instruments of response 
against states that violate international agreements? 
All of the treaties, conventions and regimes referred to earlier 
are subtended to the UN Charter, the Laws of War, 
humanitarian law and Human Rights law; substantial bodies of 
law which constitute strong moral and political prohibitions 
against the use of WMD. Specifically, the Geneva Protocol 
(1925) prohibits the use in war of chemical or biological 
weapons, and UNGAR 32/84 (1977) declares the use of nuclear 
or other WMD illegal. The Genocide Convention (1948) 
constitutes another strong prohibition, which has been cited 
recently in conventional war as well as WMD conflicts. The 
development of international criminal law is providing for 
sanctions on those who violate humanitarian law and human 
rights. 
During its war with Iran, UN sanctions were applied against 
both countries. Sanctions covered Iraqi imports of certain types 
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of weapons and parts, but were applied asymmetrically (i.e. they 
were aimed only at Iran). Thus, countries applying sanctions 
disseminated sensitive technologies to Iraq. Many new 
conventional military capabilities and facilities were built up in 
Iraq by this route. Geoff Simons writes: 
It was the US, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and other 
states that helped Saddam Hussein to build up his military 
capacity. Through the 1980s [these countries] showed no 
concern for persecuted Iraqi minorities or about Iraq's 
protracted aggression against Iran. On the contrary [these 
countries] actively aided Saddam [ ... ] by providing weapons, 
technologies, financial credits, intelligence, and in some cases 
direct military support. By early 1990, with substantial 
western [and Russian] assistance, Iraq had moved a long way 
towards acquiring nuclear weapons; and what was true in the 
nuclear field was also true in other areas of weapons 
technology [ ... ] Today the West, keen to denounce all 
Saddam's perfidies, shrugs off any responsibilities for shaping 
the events that led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Does no 
guilt attach to the man who hands a loaded gun to a known 
psychopath? The west, having helped Saddam to build up a 
substantial part of his military capability, then resolved to 
destroy it. 32 
Following the end of the war with Iran, Iraq was free of any 
restrictions inhibiting its WMD programmes. It was also freed 
to export oil, and reclaim credit from neighbours like Kuwait, 
which had benefited from seigneurage in Iraq's oil and financial 
assets during the war. 
When Iraq invaded and sought to annex Kuwait in August 
1990, it was subjected to comprehensive new UN sanctions, and 
to US-led coalition military pressure. Following the Gulf War, 
an even wider regime of UN sanctions was instituted through 
UNSCOM, now specifically related to divesting its WMD 
32Simons, The scourging of Iraq, pp. 75-6. See also Simons, Primus inter 
pariahs. 
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development programmes, and to preventing its oil wealth from 
being used to finance their restoration. 33 
The Sanctions Committee at UN Headquarters from 1991 
found itself dealing with sanctions on Iraq, former Yugoslavia, 
and later North Korea. Initially an unexpected child of 'new 
world order' enthusiasm by the US and USSR, it continued to 
evolve through disappointment, once it had become clear that 
the end of the Cold War meant 'a new world disorder'. Even so, 
for as long as Russia remained weak and China had not yet 
established secure nuclear deterrence against the US, sanctions 
continued to be an instrumentality of considerable vigour and 
effectiveness within the UN system. However, as Russia's 
alienation from the west grew, culminating in Yeltsin's threats 
against NATO during the Kosovo war of 1999, and China's 
boldness in opposing western aims in the Middle East and 
elsewhere increased, the dynamism of the sanctions regime 
declined rapidly. 
Even at the outset, there was considerable concern that 
divesting Iraq of its WMD capabilities by comprehensive 
sanctions would impose an undue humanitarian burden on the 
Iraqi people. Out of that concern grew a distinction between 
economic sanctions, which were to be total across the range of 
trade and financial instruments; and humanitarian exemptions 
to sanctions, which supposedly confer exemption on everything 
needed to sustain a reasonable level of living for the population. 
This eventually led to the establishment of the 'oil for food' 
regime, in which a quantity of revenue from permitted oil sales 
is placed in a UN-controlled escrow account and then, under 
supervision, expended to purchase necessary medicines and 
foodstuffs. 
Problems with this mechanism include the following: 
33Macdonald, 'Weapons of mass destruction' in Brady & Hilton (eds) 
Sanctions on Iraq, pp. 100-7; Steinberg, Report on arms control and non-
proliferatimt developments in the Middle East, 1998, Pt. 1; Partrick, 
Weapons of mass destruction and the threat to the Gulf. 
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• 
• 
• 
What constitutes a 'humanitarian' necessity is essentially 
defined by the US through the sanctions committee, and has 
been defined so restrictively as to cause rather than cure a 
humanitarian disaster. 
The revenues raised from permitted oil sales also go towards 
covering the costs ofUNSCOM and the sanctions regime, so 
that only a fraction of the revenue raised is applied to relief 
that actually gets to Iraqis. 
The competent authority for distributing humanitarian 
assistance is the government of Iraq, which increases the 
dependence of the people on the regime. 
Since 1995 France and Russia have made clear their resistance 
to new sanctions or military strategies against Iraq. While not 
directly confronting the US and Britain over their interpretations 
of what actions may be undertaken under the scope of UNSCR, 
this in effect gradually crippled the UNSCOM regime. France 
and Russia also lobbied for an easing of sanctions. Together, 
Russia and France are owed some $30 billion for contracted 
arms deliveries and technical assistance provided to Iraq prior to 
the imposition of sanctions. 
China has also often dissented from US policies on Iraq, and 
has taken advantage from doing so. For a number of years it 
treated Iraq as 'a problem for the western powers', and 
abstained rather than using its veto power in the Security 
Council. But following the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 
Belgrade during the course of the Kosovo conflict (1999}, the 
Chinese became considerably more reluctant to acquiesce in 
western policies over Iraq. Both China and Russia have resumed 
co-operation with Iraq in various spheres of military-security 
activity, including air defence systems and SSM missile 
technology. 
As it became clear that the destruction of its nuclear and 
chemical warfare programmes were not going to lead to a lifting 
of sanctions, or even to their substantive easing, Iraq's 
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relationship with the UN, UNSCOM, the US and Britain 
. became steadily more confrontational. Following intensive air 
action in December 1998 by the US and Britain, intended to 
coerce compliance with UNSCOM demands, Iraq ordered UN 
Inspectors out of the country. Subsequently, it refused to co-
operate with a new inspection regime, UNMOVIC, established 
by the Security Council in 1999. However, Iraq allowed an 
IAEA inspection of its main nuclear power reactor in 2000. 
The struggle between Iraq's claims to sovereign independence 
in the face of an intrusive counter-WMD regime, and the UN's 
claims that it acts with legal authority, turns upon whether or 
not some new consensus can be generated among the P-5. This 
seems unlikely, which means a confrontation between Iraq and 
its surreptitious backers, and the US and Britain. Even in those 
two countries, enthusiasm for prosecuting Saddam is waning, 
though sensitivity to the needs of Kuwait remains high. The 
strongest card on the side of the status quo is that the Sanctions 
Committee occupies the legal and moral high ground, and the 
US and Britain can veto any move to legally revise sanctions. 
Yet this is an eroding asset. Opinion in both Islamic and western 
countries has swung behind the view that UN sanctions are 
'immoral'. In any case, some Arab countries have openly 
resumed communication links with Iraq.34 
This extensive examination of the Iraqi sanctions case allows 
considerably wider generalisations. The NNPT, MTCR and 
related non-proliferation architecture remain important to the 
status quo. But this treaty-based regime has been undermined 
by: 
34Resumed US-UK air action against Iraq in mid-February 2001 appears to 
be explained by the collapse of the UN sanctions regime. As Iran continues 
to emerge as a regional great power, backed by Rusia and China, the 
western powers must now make their peace with Saddam. He, in turn, is 
already co-operating with Syria against Israel. This necessary 
rapprochement appears now so urgent and difficult that it must be 'a rough 
wooing'. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
Diffusion of technologies and 'embodied human capital' . 
Emergence of new centres of power . 
Widespread treaty violations . 
Inter-regional features of proliferation . 
Richard Butler, former head of UNSCOM Inspectors in Iraq, 
contends that WMD spread is the greatest threat to 
International stability.35 
35Butler, The greatest threat. 
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Chapter 9 
'Peace' 
We are now better placed to see what turns on the Middle East 
peace process, and why it has been pursued with sedulity. In 
what follows we shall also better understand why the process 
cannot lead to the 'final' resolution of any conflict in the region. 
Both Israel and Palestine rejected possible outcomes of the 
Camp David talks in July 2000. The Palestinian people and 
Arab allies of the Palestinian cause endorsed this on grounds of 
principle. Israeli opinion accepted 'failure' as a realistic 
alternative to uncertainty about the consequences of agreement. 
Once again the dichotomy between ideals and realities seemed 
to prevail. Given that this was predictable in advance, what 
motivated the US and its allies to try for a final peace 
settlement? 
'Final status' talks were required by the Oslo agreements to 
commence within five years. Arguments around the issues that 
would be involved were privately intense for years, ahead of 
anything appearing in the public agendas of the two sides. 
Under Oslo 11 (1995) territorial exchange and security were to 
be substantially agreed before the final stage. Within the final 
stage, until everything was agreed, nothing was agreed. 
Acrimony and procrastination over territory and security meant 
that formal final status negotiations on Jerusalem, refugees, 
water, security, and a final demarcation of boundaries, fell 
behind schedule. 
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For many supporters of the Likud government of Binyamin 
Netanyahu (1996-99}, each square inch of territory given over 
to Palestinian control was like cutting away an ounce of flesh. 
As a pragmatist, Netanyahu was never able to break with Oslo , 
though powerful elements in his coalition urged him to do so. 
Rather, he strove to take added benefits from both the US and 
the Palestinians for reluctant compliance. This frustrated the 
peace movement and much of secular society in Israel while at 
• i J ' 
the same time key supporters in the Kn~sset and in his Cabinet 
withdrew at each fresh cut of the knife: Pressure on the handle 
of the knife was exercised continuously by the US and the EU. 
Arafat's position was not necessarily more comfortable. The 
Oslo Accords, and the Madrid multilateral and Washington 
bilateral conferences that preceded these, were condemned out 
of hand by Iran, Syria, and PLO 'hardline' groups. The 
formation of Hamas from a Muslim Brotherhood rejectionist 
group symbolised disquiet among traditional Arab regimes. At 
the same time the PLO leadership, returning to Palestine from 
exile in Cairo and Lebanon and Tunis, faced new challenges 
within the Palestinian Council, and from existing Palestinian 
civil society organisations. This admixture of guerrilla leaders · 
and civil society groups proved unstable. 
The election of Barak in May 1999 made possible a rapid 
transformation of the situation on both sides. Whereas 
Netanyahu had been dragged down by his ties to land, Barak 
was a Special Forces General who knew that another Intifada 
would be catastrophic for Israel, and that the situation in South 
Lebanon was unviable. As leader of One Israel he pitched for a 
position of progressive Realism.· In his election perspective, 
Israel's long-term interests lay with negotiated security. At the 
same time, he stated that any terror occurring in Israel would 
meet with massive retaliation. The scale of his victory surprised 
many. Barak quickly visited the new King of Jordan, Abdullah, 
and after a pause met Arafat, and soon afterwards Mubarak. 
GEOPOLITICS AND MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 71 
The fourteen months of diplomatic activity that followed 
elections in Israel served more to reveal the nature of 
impediments to co-existence than the scope of a comprehensive 
agreement. Admittedly, Barak was pre-occupied for much of 
that period with Syria. And Arafat continued to be preoccupied 
with his authority and his health, giving no clear preference to 
any contender for power. Still, what began to crystallise itself 
was how impossible it would be for Jews and Palestinians living 
in close p opinquity not to be interdependent; and how far this 
situation was already beyond peing subjected to 'final' 
agreemen . In effect, an agreement negotiated by governments 
would b vulnerable to rejection; by Palestinians 'from the 
street'; b Israelis through opposition in the Knesset. 
As Prefident Bill Clinton's ~econd administration ~rew to _a 
close, the surncner of 2000 afforded a last opportumty for h1s 
principal negotiators to get the shape of a final settlement on 
record. Given their considerable accumulated experience, this 
was sufficient justification for holding the Camp David 
negotiations. 
At Camp David II, this emerged as 'Barak's offer': 
• Recognition de jure of a Palestinian state. This entails legal 
recognition of a terfitory, a people, a government, a capital, 
and a capacity to conduct external relations, including 
membership of international institutions such as the UN. 
• 'Significant, meaningful, real, elements of sovereignty' 
within (East} Jerusalem. This would include control over 
Muslim Holy Places, other religious and cultural sites, entry 
and access points to the West Bank, and the ceding of legal 
sovereignty over certain districts that would then become 
the location of (some} Palestinian government administrative 
offices. 
• Withdrawal from the entirety of the 'Gaza strip'. 
o Withdrawal from around 92% of the West Bank territories. 
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• Legal recognition of a Palestinian 'sovereign' overland 
transit route between Gaza and the West Bank. 
• Water sharing, including Palestinian sovereign control over 
aquifers in the Jordan River valley. 
• A negotiated, mutual trade regime. 
• Renewed access to the labour market in Israel for 
Palestinian workers. 
• Palestinian control of Customs, immigration and residence, 
subject to international monitoring. 
• Israel's acceptance of a 'Right of return' for Palestinians who 
left their homes in 1948, which would not be transferred to 
relatives and descendants. Compensation would be offered 
to survivors who choose not to return. 
• Israel's acceptance of a 'Right of return' for Palestinians who 
left their homes in 1967. 
• Israel's acceptance of, and participation in, a joint 
(international) plan to provide statehood and permanent 
residence for the Palestinian refugee population supported 
on the West Bank by UNRRA. 
• Formal acceptance that further demands - in limited and 
mutually agreed areas - may be exercised by a Palestinian 
state following the determination of 'final status' with 
respect to such issues as control within Jerusalem, return 
and compensation for refugees, control over water and other 
resources, settlements, and boundary disputes. 36 
That extensive offer went beyond what any previous Israeli 
government had been willing to concede. It reflected pressure by 
allies, from within society, and Jewish views from the Diaspora. 
But it is also measured how far Israelis felt able to exchange 
existential insecurity for negotiated security. In a long-term 
36The shape of the 'package', the reservations Israel sought to attach to it, 
and the s~n~e of diplomatic ~anipulation with which both sides approached 
the negottatton, .are reflected In the commentaries of the Israel-Palestine 
Center for Research and Information (IPCRI): http://www.ipcri.org/hrm. 
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perspective, that implied two things: firstly, that Palestinian 
society and its leadership were expected to develop peacefully 
and in alignment with the west; and, secondly, that peace with 
Palestine would permit Israel to evolve strong new ties with at 
least some regional neighbours. In turn, this search for roots 
within the region reflected the slowly declining strength of 
strategic intimacy between the US and Israel. 
Democratic administrations in Washington from the 1970s 
on pushed actively for a resolution of conflict between Israel and 
the Arab world. Republican administrations since the 1980s, 
with the disastrous exception of encouragement for the invasion 
of Lebanon in 1982 by Secretary of State AI Haig, also restricted 
substantive US support to Israel. All US governments after 1973 
actively courted the wealthiest and strongest Islamic countries in 
the region. Hence Clinton's push for a final status agreement 
carried with it the weight of US strategy over the 'long haul'. 
Less spectacularly but more persistently, the EU, excepting 
Britain, tilted in favour of the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, 
from the beginning of the Intifada in 1987 American public 
opinion began shifting away from the reflexive support for 
Israel that had been characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s. And 
much 'mainstream' Jewish opinion in North America, Britain 
and elsewhere sided with arguments for a 'just' settlement with 
the Palestinians, and negotiated peace with neighbouring 
states.37 
Even so, what Barak tabled at Camp David was by no means 
the whole loaf of Palestinian statehood and self-determination. 
Key 'reserve powers and limitations' were asserted by Israel. 
These included: 
37Heller, Continuity and change;, Israeli security policy. The on-line 
journal MERIA (Middle East Review of International Mfairs) is the best 
source for up-to-date commentary on Israel-US relations in an Israeli 
perspective. See: Rubin External factors in Israel's 1999 elections (~#4, 
December 1999); http://meria.biu.ac.iU. 
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• Recognition de jure, in irrevocable terms, of the state of 
Israel within the boundaries and other terms negotiated by a . 
Treaty. 
• 'Land exchange': 8% of the West Bank would be annexed 
to Israel, and an equivalent territory would be ceded from 
the northern Negev, which would probably attach to, and 
therefore enlarge, Gaza. This exchange would codify certain 
Israeli settlements on the West Bank as parts of Israel; and 
provide key military transit routes to Palestine's frontiers 
with Jordan and Syria. In exchange, overpopulated Gaza 
would find 'living room' for an (agricultural) hinterland. 
• Substantive demilitarisation of the state of Palestine. This 
should include not only the renunciation of certain types of 
armaments (e.g. fighter and bomber aircraft and heavy 
tanks), but also the explicit renunciation of terror, and of 
permission for any terror organisations of a third power to 
operate in Palestine. 
• Renunciation of operational control of air space over the 
West Bank and Gaza. 
• Acceptance of the permanent, extra-territorial, military 
presence of Israel Defence Forces along the Jordan River 
Valley. 
• A self-denying ordnance on Palestine foreswearing military 
pacts or alliances with third countries, except insofar as 
these might be part of mutually agreed security 
arrangements. 
• Abrogation of Palestinian sovereign claims to the Old City 
in East Jerusalem. 
• Alienation of the Palestinian claim to a 'Right of return' to 
all Arab lands in historic Palestine, or in Israel. 
• Renunciation of claims for compensation and restitution 
against the state of Israel, except as permitted under joint 
and international measures to resolve the status of 
refugees. 38 
38http://www.passia.org/htm; http://www.ipcri/org/htm. 
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Plainly, this is far from the sovereignty and justice envisioned by 
radical Palestinian views. How far it would be compatible with 
self-determination was also contentious. As a proposed peace 
deal it clearly tilted the balance between state and civil society in 
Palestine in favour of a state that would be strong internally, but 
weak externally. These conditions seemed to many Palestinians 
gratuitously insulting. And, since Palestinian claims are to 
succeed Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria in exercising 
sovereignty over historic Palestine, a deal along the lines of 
'Barak's offer' seemed like relinquishing a fundamental 
principle, namely the claim to all of that inheritance. 
Despite these objections, many important changes have been 
wrought in Palestinian politics and society. In exile, the PLO 
and Fatah were dominated by refugees of the 'Naqba' 
(Catastrophe) of 1948. These leaders mostly had their roots in 
Jordan. The PLO relied largely on Arab support, and on 
training and facilities provided directly or indirectly by the 
Soviet bloc. Since 1993 the PLO has had to integrate the 
leadership of the Palestinian masses, who mainly originate in 
Gaza, and whose perspectives on Israel were shaped by the June 
War of 1967, and subsequent Israeli occupation policies. 
Furthermore, the PLO has become an ally of the US and EU, 
which provide most of the professional and technical support 
for the transition to statehood. In consequence, the PLO has 
developed a 'proto-state' structure, including an Authority that 
functions like the Executive branch of government; a Council 
that has legislative powers; administrative bodies overseeing the 
lives of some 2.5 million 'citizens'; and security functions that 
include the suppression of terrorism. Palestinian society still 
demands that its leaders 'resist the oppressors'. But today that 
means negotiating with Israelis, while persuading the people to 
retain their ideals. 
These transformations are unlikely to be reversed, but remain 
incomplete. Hence it is important to look at groups contending 
for influence around Arafat's leadership. 
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Arafat 'loyalists' may comprise between two-thirds and three-
quarters of Palestinian elites. Arafat patronises a much smaller 
absolute number of supporters, whose elevation and reward 
depend primarily on service to the PLO. But he retains· 
widespread support through this patronage. Most jobs in the 
new Palestinian administrative infrastructure are funded by the 
US and EU, including the PA, PLC, and most government 
agencies. The livelihood and careers of thousands of key 
professionals turn on transforming the PLO and its leadership. 
This base therefore allows Arafat to maintain authority when 
challenged. In turn, prospective successors, including Deputies, 
Ministers, Mayors, and Party Organisers, can maximise credit 
and minimise blame for their own activities by claiming the 
exigencies of transformation. 39 
A second source of legitimacy is that Arafat has not sought to 
suppress critical comment or even dissent among supporters. 
Palestinian society is comparatively open. A 'loyal but critical' 
opposition to Arafat's leadership has developed. Faruq 
Qaddumi and an important group of Fatah and PLO 'outsiders' 
have refused to return to Palestine. Without rejecting the Oslo 
Accords outright, these figures adopted a 'wait and see' 
approach. Perhaps 20% of cadres within Palestinian society 
would support this group in a crisis of authority or succession in 
which Arafat was deemed to have 'failed'. Opposition is further 
strengthened by the PA ignoring resolutions of the PLC on 
occasions, and by the security apparatus using illegal methods of 
interrogation. Pessimists in Palestinian society suggest that 
power in the new Palestine is being concentrated unduly in the 
Executive branch, and that the legislature and courts count for 
little more than window-dressing. This analogy with a fully 
functioning democracy may be out of place, considering the 
importance of the Oslo process and the external duress under 
which the PA has been operating in the area of security. It also 
39Rubin, The future of Palestinian politics: factions3 frictions and functions, 
pp. 3-5; Rubin, The tram;formation of Palestinian politics. 
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tends to ignore the palpable strength of 'grass roots' Palestinian 
opmwn. 
Hence at the time of Camp David there was a clear 
Palestinian consensus favouring peace with Israel, providing that 
the territory of the new state would be consolidated rather than 
fragmented; that it would cover virtually all the occupied 
territories; and that economic conditions would improve 
considerably. 
But Fatah militants have a significant power base in Nablus 
and Ramallah. Marwan al-Barguti, Secretary of the West Bank 
Committee, is the most prominent figure. His actions first 
became significant in opposing restrictions on Palestinian 
organisations that were introduced by the Netanyahu 
government. Fatah 'insiders' have the capacity to organise 
protest against Arafat, and continuously do so. Until after the 
failure of Camp David, they had not acted against the PLO 
leadership when it 'laid down the law'. 
PA security and intelligence forces have been loyal to Arafat, 
and have an interest in who succeeds him. Pressures from the 
US, EU, and Israel (including constraints on funding) have 
meant that the security apparatus must show it is efficient. As 
Palestinian society shifts towards democracy, the security 
apparatus cannot invoke 'traditional' authority. Means of 
repression found in other Arab countries have been curbed. 
Hence in some ways the security apparatus has been propelled 
into the political process. This was notable when many Hamas 
and other prisoners were released from detention following the 
outbreak of the second Intifada.40 
Much of Arafat's nominal support remains ambivalent. 
Certain elements are treacherous, awaiting his fall, the failure of 
his health, or a crisis in relations with Israel. Within Palestinian 
society there are Social Democrats, Marxists, and Human 
Rights activists who aspire to a Palestinian state with a very 
different balance between it and civil society than anything 
"
0
'The Palestinian authority and the OA', Strategic Comments, 4#10. 
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Arafat would want. Their best hope is Abu Ala, who has 
sounded the most encouraging notes on future democracy. 
Hamas is a movement with widespread influence but 
restricted power in Palestine. Arafat cannot extirpate Hamas. Its 
roots are to an extent home grown, reflecting tension between 
the parallel but different Palestinian experiences of violent 
opposition to Israel under direct Israeli rule, and resistance to 
Israel that was until recently based abroad. Yet Arafat cannot 
permit Hamas to become powerful enough to win a civil war. 
For Hamas to unleash civil war, or even a direct bid for power 
backed by force, would contradict Palestinian ideals of national 
unity. Nor does Hamas inherit the whole legacy of the Intifada. 
A former leader, !mad al-Faluji, is in the PA. Many Gaza 
resistance fighters have entered service with the new Palestinian 
structures, or become political doves. Inherent tensions between 
the rejection of Israel, the rejection of Oslo, and the rejection of 
a Palestinian state, have led previously militant followers in 
different directions. Sheik Ahmad Yassin, spiritual leader of 
Hamas, must therefore judge whether, and if so when, the 
movement will exchange bombs for ballot boxes. 
This is what Arafat and al-Faluji have sought to induce; while 
Y assin, Arab sponsors of irreconcilable opposition to Israel, and 
elements of the Palestinian 'outsiders', have denied the realistic 
possibility of peace with the 'Zionist' enemy. Even this concept 
of a struggle between Hamas and Arafat's support base is too 
simple. Some Marxist PLO factions, notably PFLP and PDFLP, 
continue to reject the 'peace process' as a sham that benefits 
only the Palestinian 'power elite'. Overt support for this position 
clusters around Hayder Abd al-Shafi, a Gaza leader who 
resigned from the PLC because Arafat ignored a number of its 
resolutions. 
A large Palestinian family might have members working in 
highly varied roles, some closely supporting, others opposing, 
the regime. Much privileged information may pass through such 
a channel. Add traditional Islamic values, a revolutionary 
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tradition, secretive methods of organising resistance, strong pre-
existing factional and family ties, tensions between Christians 
and Fundamentalists, Gaza and West Bank, and secular and 
traditional approaches to such issues as the roles and rights of 
women. Then also add the susceptibility of Palestinian 
structures to influences coming from external sponsors. This 
admixture presents a difficult challenge to Arafat's modified 
authoritarian rule. 
Palestinians as a people pride themselves on being able to 
resist, survive, and yet do things effectively, with style and 
honour. Palestinian society is inherently pluralistic on such 
important subjects as religion, nationalism, market versus 
traditional forces in an economic setting, and democracy. All of 
this is of immediate importance, as politics within Palestinian 
society has rather suddenly moved out of the shadows and into 
the world's gaze. But we must also take account of the massive 
deterioration of Palestinian living standards, which may have 
halved in real terms during the Oslo peace process. In this 
complex social context hope, resentment, fear and a will to 
'vengeance', contend around four demands for justice for the 
Palestinian cause. These have provoked widespread violence, 
including some 350 Palestinian dead, since the failure of Camp 
David. The four key Palestinian demands are: 
o East Jerusalem must be included in Palestine as its capital. 
• Gaza and the West Bank belong unequivocally to a 
sovereign Palestine. 
• Dispossessed Palestinians have a 'Right of return' to their 
former homes. 
• Jewish settlements must be removed from occupied 
territories returned to Palestinian sovereignty.41 
41There is little sign that these demands have been altered during the course 
of the new Intifada. However, several rounds of abortive negotiations have 
been held between Israel and its chief interlocutors, the US, Egypt, the EU 
and the UN. UN reports suggest that Israel's economic blockade of the 
Palestinian Authority is on the verge of bankrupting Palestinian civil society 
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The key issue between Arafat's leadership and Palestinian 
society is whether these components of the demand for justice 
are absolute or negotiable. In turn, opposition to Arafat, and 
political support for him from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other 
countries, coalesces around what concessions he might propose 
to make. There is an added dilemma: to concentrate on the 
satisfaction of injustice may be to sacrifice concessions from 
Israel in areas of greater substance for a future Palestinian state. 
This is not a time when Palestinian society and its leaders can 
make easy or rapid decisions. A process of conscious social 
reflection, much of it bitter and violent, was to be expected. In 
an ugly way, Palestinian society can best vent its own 
frustrations by aiming at the symbolic enemy, Israel. 
Arafat, for much of his life spiritual director of implacable 
resistance to the state of Israel, is due to become the father of a 
new nation-state. But to become the one, he must finally 
relinquish the other. Until now, this has been a process, a 
chrysalis that has seemed irreversible but also indeterminate. Its 
'last stage' has nothing directly to do with the Oslo Agreements. 
It is about consolidating the domestic and external support to 
justify profoundly difficult compromises. Within a matter of 
weeks during 2000, from the frustration of Barak's diplomacy 
towards Syria, the need to do this sprang from the quiet recesses 
to the floodlit centre stage of diplomacy. Nor was doing it a 
matter of western-style 'decision-making'. Rather, Arafat had to 
bring the news, both good and bad, to his lieutenants, his 
people, and his allies. He then had to compose himself for the 
'end game' of negotiation. Only after that could he declare a 
settlement to be the solemn and sanctified will of the Palestinian 
people and the Arab world. 
and state institutions. At the same time, the character of violence is 
changing: Hamas and Hizbollah are making efforts to attack Israel at 
vulnerable points, close to South Lebanon and inside Israel. Whereas 
Palestinian demands have not changed, Israel's willingness to negqtiate on 
Jerusalem and settlements has almost certainly diminished. 
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A peace agreement with Israel might have emerged from this 
confluence of ideas and dramatic action. But with a US 
presidential election in mid-November 2000, and mounting 
evidence of instability in the domestic political process in Israel, 
there were no strong incentives for Palestinian concessions on 
key principles. Instead, Arafat allowed his militants to exert 
force against Israeli settlements and the IDF in Palestinian areas. 
For Israel this sudden eruption of a new Intifada, however 
predictable, came as a considerable shock. Its immediate 
consequences were to undermine the peace movement, destroy 
Barak's prospects of re-election, highlight the importance of the 
US presidential election, and bring into question the pivotal role 
of the relationship between the US and Israel. 
According to Jonathan Rynhold: 
Moving from right to left on the Israeli political spectrum, 
there are four identifiable approaches to relations with the US 
Executive regarding the peace process: Ultra-nationalism, 
Conservatism, Realism, and Progressivism. These approaches 
are distinguishable by their [ ... ] attitudes towards [ ... ] the 
relative value of maintaining control over the territory 
captured by Israel in the Six Day War, and the relative value 
of the [US] as a factor in Israeli security. 42 
Ultra-nationalism is rooted to the idea that the modern state of 
Israel ought to seek Eretz Israel, the biblical land. This idea is 
often conflated with 'Zionism', particularly in Islamic and 
Christian criticisms of Israeli politics; but it is ideologically, and 
theologically, quite different. 
The political ascendancy of Ultra-nationalism arrived with the 
Likud governments of Prime Ministers Begin and Shamir in the 
period following the October War of 1973. Subsequently, Ultra-
nationalism lost its domestic ideological base. In 2000, less than 
five per cent of Israelis would have supported war with the 
42Rynhold, 1sraeli-American relations and the peace process,, MERIA 4#2, 
June 2000); http://meria.biu.ac.iV. 
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Palestinians. In foreign policy, Ultra-nationalism conceded too 
much to the US to claim that Israel could have an 'independent' 
position on any major regional security issue. However, the 
second Intifada of 2000 strongly revived the electoral appeal of 
a former ultra-nationalist leader, Ariel Sharon. Sharon became 
Prime Minister in February 2001 after an election campaign in 
which he gave little away about his strategy towards the 
Palestinians. 
The Conservative approach has usually been associated with 
the 'pragmatic' wing of Likud: attached strongly to Eretz Israel, 
but conscious of the need to maintain a broad civic base, and, in 
foreign policy, of the need to balance aims and resources. 
Coercion by the US and EU over the holding of negotiations 
with the Palestinians increased during the 1990s. Netanyahu, 
Prime Minister between 1996 and 1999, procrastinated but 
eventually compromised with 'land for peace'. He sanctioned 
but postponed new West Bank settlements; agreed to return 
further territories to Palestinian control, but delayed at each 
juncture; and eventually lost the support of Ultra-nationalists, 
including his foreign Minister Sharon. It is likely, however, that 
Netanyahu will make a comeback, particularly if a Sharon 
government fails to make progress on security issues. 
Realists are associated with a military-political view oflsrael's 
options. Shaped by leading Generals who then entered politics, 
this tradition stems from secular Zionism, the settler movement, 
the War of Independence, and later wars. Since the October 
War of 1973, the military establishment in Israel has clearly 
understood the limited security to be derived from territorial 
conquest in an era of air power and high technology 
surveillance. For Israel that war was a triumph won due to 
extremely costly mobilisation, and heavy human sacrifice. Even 
so, the confrontational intervention of the Soviet Union sharply 
reminded the US not to let its regional client break the limits 
entailed in superpower detente. Arms control measures in Sinai 
and on the Golan, developed through American diplomacy, 
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were essential to post-war stabilisation, and to the achievement 
of peace with Egypt. The Israeli military establishment, 
represented by the Barak government, has shown little fear of a 
comprehensive settlement with the Palestinians, even one 
involving major concessions over Jerusalem. Its security 
perspectives are long-term and long-distance, preoccupied by 
Iraq, Iran, WMD issues, Hizbollah, and the scope for 
deterioration of Israel's regional security environment and 
relationship with the US and EU. 
The Progressive approach to neighbours and security has been 
most clearly represented by Shim on Peres, who recently failed to 
win the Presidency, and by Shlomo Ben-Ami, Foreign Minister 
in Barak's coalition. For him, the situation following the Camp 
David talks was 'a moment of truth'. Progressives accord no 
significance to Eretz Israel in security policy. Bargaining for 
territory is not perceived as primary to conflict management. 
Neither is there a priority for security as understood in military-
political terms. Rather, the principles of foreign policy ought to 
be the same as those of 'normal' civil society. International 
relations should be run on principles of justice, democracy and 
human rights. This approach has gained significance in foreign 
policy because of its strength in domestic society in Israel. 
Palestinians are not seen as enemies or adversaries, but as 
neighbours and prospective allies, with the same full range of 
rights Israelis possess. The implicit condition of this is 
reciprocity; that Palestinians must be able to understand and 
. d d 43 accept mter epen ence. 
Overall, there is a growth of longer perspectives on security in 
Israeli politics. But no one of these four main approaches is 
predominant. Ultra-nationalism is a minority position, whose 
electoral support is concentrated in Ultra Orthodox religious 
communities. But it has been revived, for the time being, by the 
renewed Palestinian Intifada. Progressivism is a popular 
approach, which exerts strong moral persuasion. But its 
43Sayigh, Palestine's prospects; Helier, Israel's dilemmas. 
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optimism does not run as strongly in most of Israel's elites, 
including the Knesset. The Ashkenazi elite that for long 
dominated security policy, and underpinned Realism, is being 
displaced by Sabras and Sephardis, whose views of democracy, 
Human Rights and coexistence with neighbours are distinctively 
'Israeli'. Hence the middle ground in Israeli politics and foreign 
policy continues to be battled over by Conservative-Realists (e.g. 
Barak) and Realist-Conservatives (eg. Netanyahu). 
Now perhaps we can arrive at a more substantive conclusion 
regarding 'Peace'. A Final Status agreement, even supposing that 
one can be reached, will not end the confrontation that exists 
between Israel and Palestine. At best, it will shift the terms of 
confrontation ftom a process of negotiation driven by the US 
and EU, towards one in which the two sides have a self-
sustaining, overt, dialogue as nominal equals. Yet no Final 
Status agreement will reconcile irreconcilable aspirations on 
both sides; or make powerful Israel and weak Palestine true 
equals. 
At Camp David Barak and Arafat still could not agree 
privately to agree publicly on the terms of an overall outcome. 
Hence it seemed necessary to agree publicly to disagree within a 
mutually accepted framework, Oslo, even if that meant 
undermining the framework itself. Rather than risk losing the 
substance of detailed private agreements already arrived at, 
because of the impossibility of agreeing publicly under the terms 
of a pre-designated timetable, both sides have allowed their 
differences to become ventilated in their home societies and in 
' the capitals of allies. The risk in this is that the 'moment of 
truth' may have arrived, and passed. The exhausted Oslo 
framework may have disintegrated before a Final Status 
agreement could be concluded. If that has occurred already, 
then existential will has asserted itself over behaviouralist hope. 
The precarious possibility of such absolute conflict means 
that it may take time for Israel and Palestine to resume a 
substantive dialogue about coexistence. 
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Chapter 10 
Inter-regional international 
relations 
It is important before proceeding further to link together 
contentions that have already appeared concerning an imminent 
technological revolution and its possible political consequences: 
0 
• 
• 
The deployment of a 'thin' NMD system by the US is 
probable, even if that is deemed by Russia and other 
countries to violate the ABM Treaty. Even so, and even if 
great power relations remain fundamentally stable, it is 
difficult to envisage Russia, China and other countries not 
following the US example. This implies a technology 
competition that will have effects throughout the 
international order. 
The most immediate and critical development from this 
technology competition might be the formation of a virtual 
alliance between Russia and China. One of the last foreign 
policy achievements of the Gorbachev regime was a 
settlement of long-standing Russian-Chinese territorial 
disputes, and restitution to China for much of the economic 
exploitation it suffered during a previous alliance, when 
Stalin and Krushchev promised but failed to deliver massive, 
rapid, industrial development. 
Today, it might not be too difficult for both countries, in 
light of their vulnerabilities and ambitions, to sink their 
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0 
• 
• 
0 
• 
• 
• 
• 
differences in a pact that would be defensive in terms of the 
global strategic balance, but offensive in terms of institutions · 
and alignments in the international system. 
Should such a pact appear, central Asia, south Asia and the 
Middle East would become regions of vigorous opposition 
to western interests. The proliferation of missile technologies 
by Russia and China, already apparent, would be associated 
with other, radical, political or even religious ideologies, 
such as those that prevail in Afghanistan and Iran. 
There follow immediate ramifications for the place of TMD. 
This is currently being examined by Israel (in association 
with Turkey, Jordan and perhaps Egypt); and by EU 
countries (collaboratively and through NATO) as a possible 
response to regional WMD spread. 
The US is sponsoring a strategy of persuasive and 
determined consultation (CDI) with other countries as its 
NMD technologies mature. 
For countries that lack NMD or TMD options, new types of 
'defensive strategy' will emerge. For instance, Iraq and 
Serbia have exchanged experiences of hiding, dispersal, 
using dummy targets, and 'duelling' with ground-to-air 
radar. 'Poor men's WMD defence' could be facilitated by 
Russia and China. 
As Iraq did in the past, these disaffected regimes may avail 
themselves of conditions of instability in adjacent countries 
and regions. 
The world wide activities of Osama Bin Laden build on this 
'model'. In geopolitical terms, 'next door' to the Middle East 
is the vast region of Central Asian, which is experiencing 
under-development, instability, and near-anarchy. 
Such conditions are ideal for traditionalist and 
fundamentalist adversaries of the western dominated status 
quo. 
Guerrilla warfare, terrorism, brute financial muscle, and 
even religious orthodoxy might lead to the false perception 
• 
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that entities of this kind possess little interest in the most 
advanced military technologies. The example of India under 
a Hindu nationalist government gives the lie to that serious 
error. 
Proliferation incentives may originate in threat-specific 
perceptions of insecurity (e.g. mutual fear between Israel-
Syria, Israel-Iraq or Iran-Iraq,); yet the recourse to 
proliferation seems to involve a long-term search for self-
reliant development with security. 
• 
WMD proliferation may have become causally linked to 
failures in the Middle East peace process. 
The conclusion we face is that the non-proliferation regime of 
the international system is inadequate to prevent or contain 
WMD spread across the Middle East. If it is to work more 
successfully, strategies of 'rehabilitation' must be attuned to 
existential rather than behaviouralist ascriptions of motivation.44 
This will not be straightforward because, according to the 
theoretical cleavage found within the earlier review of 
geopolitical discourse (p. 23 ), 'this polarity in epistemology is 
neither accidental nor avoidable'. 
44Walker, 'The imperative of nuclear ordering' in International Affairs 
76#4, pp. 722-4; Wilkening, Ammding the ABM treaty; Daa]der et al., 
Deploying NMD: not whether but hour, Latter, Reducing the dangers of 
CBW. 
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Chapter 11 
The structures of an 
international system 
The British discovered several major lessons about power in the 
long century following the defeat of Napoleon. First, the 
creation of a self-transforming world economy based on 
economic interdependence and free trade entails the eventual 
relinquishing of hegemony. Second, a world order containing 
but one superpower can impose a hierarchy on international 
relations; but heavy security costs are incurred in maintaining a 
stable long-term equilibrium. Third, if 'hegemonic war' is 
perceived as non-rational by the dominant power, (as it 
certainly was by the British) then putative new superpowers, 
nascent new nations, and other actors seeking advantage 
through change, may nonetheless violently challenge the 
prevailing equilibrium. Finally, if war were to be limited, then 
persuasion and arbitration must be initiated with the aim of 
gaining the co-operation of all great powers in managing the 
international system. Tragically, war was not avoided, though 
Britain, Germany, Russia, France, Japan and the US had more 
interests in common than interests that were opposed. 45 
45Gilpin, War and change in world politics; Kennedy, The rise and fall of 
British naval mastery; Kennedy, The rise and fall of the great powers; 
Strachan, The first world war- I: To arms. 
GEOPOLITICS AND MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 89 
This is not an argument that 'history must repeat itself'. Nor 
does it postulate the permanently operating laws of power 
politics, or the special dangers of totalitarian nationalism. It 
suggests, however, that international relations are not an arena 
of much vision. Instinct and opportunity predominate. The 
interests of states are supported collectively by large groupings 
under leaderships that may be wise or foolish. But whether wise 
or foolish, relations between governments are competitive. 
Liberal interdependence may have softened this by crystallising 
some common ideas into theoretical and institutional forms. But 
has competition among states yet become adequately bound by 
ethical rules or a superior system of law? 
The project of 'One World at Peace' expresses the ideals of 
American foreign policy. This American ideology gained 
predominance through the catastrophe of a Second World War. 
The influence of the US appeared to propose that power in 
international relations should be effectively transposed from the 
realm of force into that of institutions and law. The UN Charter 
entered into force in 1945. The formal aim of 'One World at 
Peace' thus came to be shared by the victorious western powers; 
Middle East states including Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, 
Iraq, and in due course Israel, Jordan and others; by 
rehabilitated Japan and the two German states; and by a 
multitude of new states created after decolonisation and the end 
of the Cold War. Today, the UN numbers 191 member states. 
Within the UN system, war, conquest, territorial annexations 
and illicit proliferation or use of WMD have become illegal. 
For a few brief months in 1990-91 almost all states coalesced 
against Iraq in favour of the Charter's central norms and 
resolutions. Yet global unity under US leadership proved 
evanescent. Chinese support in the UNSC was always at a price. 
France and Germany, sometimes with Russia, had alternative 
ideas about managing the crisis. The Arab states were unwilling 
to see Saddam totally defeated. There was ambivalence when he 
called for ]ihad against a western coalition entering Arab 
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territories, and particularly when he launched SSM attacks on 
Israel, a spectator in the crisis. The saga of post-war sanctions 
has been outlined above. 
Even so, a 'New World Order' was proclaimed. A decade on, 
a 'New Economics' is said to be annihilating scarcity, creating a 
new rationality around controlled market movements. 
Arguably, such a system makes it possible to buy security, to 
have NMD and TMD, to build defensive coalitions under CD I, 
and effectively to entrench the structures of a worldwide 
western security system. Beneath an over-arching astropolitics, 
underpinned by 'globalization', justified by 'One World at 
Peace', a benign new liberal hegemony could be instituted. 
This perhaps answers to the first two 'lessons' of the British 
era: Military hegemony can be traded off in favour of dynamic 
technological superiority; and the productiveness of the global 
economy covers most of the costs of both security and 
development. But what then, in view of this optimistic /aisser 
faire, about the requirements of managed systemic change, 
namely that in order to avoid war it is necessary to achieve the 
co-operation of all great powers? 
A system must be greater than the sum of its parts, in the 
sense that: 
• There is observable behaviour in a particular arrangement 
that can be described as 'systemic'. 
• Systemic behaviour is rational because the system provides 
optimisation and/or reference. 
• Order in a human system entails an equilibrium towards 
which the system will strive to return (i.e. parametric 
conditions constitute feedback loops to the core 
arrangement of parts). 
• 'Systemic behaviour' recurs or endures and is open to 
testing. 
·-·-·-
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Human systems are notably difficult to discern, owing to the 
variability of values and aims that inform conduct. But we may 
suggest that a system cannot be said to exist where orderly 
behaviour is less than dominant over the sum of its parts, or 
when such conduct does not endure sufficiently to be open to 
testing and/or validation. 
The 'British School' of International Relations during the past 
century argued for the existence of an international system that 
may be described as a 'society of states', on the ground that 
states obligate themselves to pursue law and order. Hedley Bull, 
Alan James, James Mayall and Adam Roberts analyse the forces 
of nationalism; the role of international institutions; and the 
extension of law into criminal justice and humanitarian claims. 
Michael Howard and Philip Windsor influenced British strategic 
studies towards Clausewitz rather than Mahan.46 
The 'North American school', exemplified by Morton 
Kaplan, David Easton, Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn 
came to be dominated by strategic explanations' of international 
conflict founded on behaviouralist 'rules of the game'. A 'loyal 
opposition' around Bernard Brodie kept Clausewitz alive; but in 
the spirit of Mahan's and Mackinder's geopolitics it came to be 
held that the 'rational actor' will not jeopardise interests that 
reside in the prevalence of the system, however despicable it may 
appear. For example, fundamental ideological differences will be 
subordinated to rules of conduct that flow from the predictable 
consequences of any intentional use of nuclear weapons.<7 
As the Cold War was modified by detente, behaviouralist 
theory faced a paradox. A true test of 'rules of the game' could 
46Bull, The anarchical society; James, Peacekeepi"g in international 
relations; Mayall, Nationalism and intemational society; Roberts, United 
11ations, divided world; Howard, The causes of wars and other essays; 
Windsor, Germany and the management of detente. 
47Easton, An approach to the analysis of political systems; Kahn, On 
escalation; Kaplan, Systems and process in international politics; Schelling, 
The strategy of conflict; Schelling Arms mJd influence; Brodie, Strategy in 
the missile age. 
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arise only via an abrogation of those 'fail safe' mechanisms that 
underpinned mutual vulnerability. It seemed technology might 
be doing that work anyhow, by creating novel 'first use' options 
for nuclear weapons, and by promising to remove mutual 
strategic vulnerability through strategic defence. The North 
American school thus became interested in normative theory, 
and a more sociological approach to international relations. A 
distinction was established between 'system' and 'structure'. An 
'international system' that generated pointless or 
counterproductive rules of the game could not be a human 
system, but at best one in which its physics far outstripped its 
politics. According to Stanley Hoffman and Robert Jervis, for 
instance, a system in which politics manages physics must be 
capable of sustaining negotiated normative shifts, and of 
transcending the 'logic of images'. But just as it seemed both sets 
of powers laying claim to the future of history would be bound 
to arbitrating their fundamental differences, the Soviet-type 
societies collapsed altogether.48 
In The end of history, Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the 
inexorable triumph of neo-liberalism. According to this 
anarcho-capitalist argument, world-wide competition to sell 
such things as microwave ovens would provide all the new 
norms needed to resolve conflicts among interdependent 
nations. The Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the economic 
vicissitudes of the 1990s have mightily dented that optimism. In 
defence and security as well as in economics, regionalism · 
appears as the rule of the day. Western unity and transatlantic 
collaboration are absent as presumptions in the face of 
challenges and threats to security; and need to be forged anew, 
at great cost, with every crisis. NATO, though unique, potent, 
and unchallenged, has shown itself poorly adapted to the 
requirements of coalition warfare or crisis management. NATO 
expansion covers but nineteen countries and under a tenth of 
"
8Hoffman, International relations: the long road to theory; Jervis, The logic 
of images in international relations. 
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the world's population. There is no coherent architecture for 
Globalisation. UN peacekeeping remains sadly deficient. 49 
Western societies and governments are in denial over these 
facts. Indeed a war in Kosovo was fought to deny them. Overt 
or covert counter-interventions, for example in Afghanistan or 
Chechnya, have become the west's commonplace reaction to 
conditions of conflict that cannot be directly confronted. The 
credo of 'Globalization' inverts the role of states and markets. 
All of this proceeds at heavy cost, directly in terms of the 
economic and military resources involved; indirectly in terms of 
the example and the lessons which are set before the silent eyes 
of aspiring regional or global powers. Global great power co-
operation therefore seems a chimera. International relations 
continue to generate wars, conquests and territorial 
annexations; the proliferation of WMD; struggles between debt 
and development; clashes of religion and culture; the spread of 
nations and nationalism; and anarchistic forms of 
Globalisation. 50 An overall conclusion about the Middle East in 
the structures of the international system today suggests: 
• The region will not be left free of external intervention so 
long as its resources are prized by powerful nations. 
• Coercive intervention remains a norm of international 
politics. 
• 'Globalization' makes such interventions more frequent and 
intense. 
• 'Global governance' regularises interventions. 
• The struggle between Israel and the Arab states over 
territory and statehood contains a deep antagonism between 
Judaism and Islam. 
49Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man; Thomas, The military 
challenges of transatlantic coalitions. 
5
°Freedman, 'What happened to the balance of power?', pp. 9-12.; Murphy, 
'Global governance: poorly done and poorly understood'; Tenet, The 
worldwide threat in 2000: global realities of our national security. 
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• Within Israel, the language of security is fundamentally sub-
divided between irreconcilable religious and secular 
discourses over peace and stability. 
• Turkey and Iran play crucial roles in relation to strategy and 
symbols in the regional struggle with Israel. 
• Turkey has committed itself to a secular form of the state, 
and has strictly suppressed Islamic extremism, made peace 
and a security treaty with Israel, and developed its 
commerce. But Turkish society is infused with the forces of 
Islamic renewal. 
• Iran remains balanced between more and less radical Islamic 
fundamentalism. Less radical forces have been gaining 
ground. But the revival of civil society, long frustrated by 
regime constraints and the costs of war and sanctions, does 
not mean that Iran will join the regional status quo. 
• Russia and China are assiduously assisting Iran to 
modernise and develop major new military technologies. 
• Arab and western states may be obliged to accept a 
resurgence of Iraqi capabilities, in preference to allowing 
Iran too much regional scope, while persevering with a 
morally bankrupt campaign of UN sanctions. 
• Societies in the Arab states are led by traditional rulers or 
revolutionary regimes, for whom past defeats by Israel mean 
little set beside Islamic solidarity and a determination to 
redress the Palestinian 'Naqba'. 
• Another war could easily bring the collapse of ruling 
regimes in Egypt, Jordan, perhaps even in Saudi Arabia. 
These regimes are presently unprepared for war. Yet state 
policy still plays an overarching, negative, role in relation to 
peace and war, because strong civil societies, hostile to 
Israel, are developing all over the Arab world. 
• These civil societies are less attracted to Globalisation than 
to Islamic renewal, justice and the Palestinian cause. 
• This results in greater pressure on the Palestinians, whose 
social, economic and political structures are literally torn 
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between the blandishments and pressures exerted by Israel, 
their lasting neighbour, and their brother Arabs in the wider 
regton. 
These aspects of regional instability suggest crucial faults with 
an international system built on liberal interdependence, 
behaviouralist geopolitics, and prevailing security and 
development policies. On a theoretical level these structures 
provide possibilities for creating a new kind of order and 
equilibrium. But the evidence suggests that in the absence of 
active new American-led initiatives - pan-regional, geopolitical, 
and capable of relating security and development to the values 
held by actors - a Clausewitzian logic will justify transcending 
existential rejection of the 'closed' system upheld by the western 
and Israeli 'other'. 
96 FORSVARSSTUDIER 5/2002 
Chapter 12 
Conclusions 
The 'new' Middle East is the product of cumulative change 
within a highly resistant geopolitical framework. Optimists wait 
for this change to qualitatively alter its own context. Pessimists 
contend this will 'never' happen. Both are mistaken. 
There is a 'new' Middle East. Change has inexorably 
produced something quite other than the region of even ten 
years ago. Another major war between Israel and its Arab · 
neighbours is most unlikely. A Palestinian state with substantive 
domestic sovereignty and the scope to make its own way 
forward is de facto recognised by the world. Civil society, 
though not democracy, is strengthening all across the region 
except in Iraq. Democracy in the western sense remains unique 
to Israel; but a language of democratic understanding is shared 
among the foreign policy and economic elites of almost all 
countries. There is an appetite for sharing in the riches of 
Globalisation, and a willingness to see 'peace' being made in 
that cause. 
On the other hand the 'Peace process' initiated after the end 
of the Cold War, substantiated by the Oslo Agreements, has not 
significantly altered the geopolitics of the region. Israel has been 
most reluctant to exchange 'land for peace', particularly 
following the assassination of Rabin and the election of 
Netanyahu. 'Peace' for Egypt also meant little of substance after -
Sinai was recovered. Throughout, Jordan has remained 
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committed, but too weak to decisively alter either Israeli 
obduracy or Palestinian resentment. Syria, until the present, has 
remained beyond engagement. Iran has actively, and with great 
success, skewed the prospects of the Oslo process, both by 
terrorising South Lebanon, and by coercing Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf States into continued support for Syria. Saudi Arabia 
has redoubled the difficulties this creates by quietly supporting 
both Iraq's resistance to the US and UN, and the 'recidivist' 
elements in Arafat's entourage, who have the closest links to 
Hamas. 
The US and the EU have increasingly pushed a reluctant Israel 
into conformity with western policy aims that entail regional 
stability on key Arab terms. But to the extent that this has 
succeeded, it has stemmed from respect for determined Islamic 
resistance rather than willing Arab compliance. Iran is feared. 
Hizbollah claims victory for Israel's military withdrawal from 
South Lebanon. In death as in life, Asad is respected for refusing 
to make 'peace', even while virtually annexing more territory 
than Israel took in the June War. The same western respect is 
not accorded to the Houses of Saud and AI-Sabah. 
In stark contrast, Turkey has aligned itself in economic and 
strategic terms with a 'peace bloc' including Israel and Jordan, 
which is aimed, tacitly at least, at frustrating Syrian and Iranian 
support for terror and subversion. This strategic alignment gives 
Israel greater security and room for manoeuvre in the longer 
term. But it does not much affect the peace process directly. 
Meanwhile, Russia and China assist Iraq and Iran in their 
WMD programmes, which could in future trigger new 
instabilities. China has also developed strong technology links, 
albeit of different types, with Israel and Saudi Arabia. China, 
India, Pakistan, Russia and Japan all seek to dilute the strategic 
role the US plays in the region. Some EU members, while 
supporting 'western' positions, promote national interests 
distinctly at variance with those of the US. All of this makes 
Islamic unity less real substantively, and more important 
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symbolically. Israel, always prone to lump its Muslim 'enemies' 
together, plays all sides off against the middle. 
Social structures in the Middle East are dichotomous. Security 
policy and substantive control of the conduct of external 
relations lie in every state with a committee of Generals. Yet 
each society has been growing a new and deeper sense of civil 
and human freedoms. Paradoxically, while the opposing 
committees of Generals find it easier to speak a confidential 
language of 'peace', civil societies have become more militant, 
impatient and prospectively recalcitrant in opposing the kinds of 
deals that might be done, at Camp David or wherever. 
If indeed we are on the cusp, turning between a rapid 
consolidation of 'One world at peace' and a renewed 'Clash of 
civilisations', then the discipline of Geopolitics will have a vital 
role to play in assessing the currents of change. But we must be 
mindful of the epistemic divide over behavioural and existential 
modelling. Geopolitical studies established to serve 'system 
building' behaviourist assumptions will tend to underestimate 
the living stuff of low-level conflict, and overestimate the 
potential for control from the skies above. 
There is therefore ample scope for a new variant of 
'Geopolitics'. This would be a kind of 'Twister theory', aiming 
to accurately adapt political calculations to the lack of fit 
between 'covering laws' framed by behaviouralist system 
building, and the Clausewitzian approach to comprehending 
absolute wars that, all other advances notwithstanding, are 
liable to recur. 
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Table: 
Statistical profile of the Middle East 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Bahrain 5.0 0.7 0.6 0.18 0.3 0.6 11 0.006 3.0 
Cyprus 7.9 1.1 0.8 0.24 0.4 0.7 10 0.09 1.8 
EJ!'I!Pt 56 8.0 64.8 19,7 2.4 5.1 440 8.6 31 
Iran 62.5 9.0 67.5 20.5 2.5 5.3 513 14.2 30 
Iraa 18.3 2.6 22.2 6.7 2.7 5.8 400 3.8 40 
Israel 79 11.2 6 2 7.2 15.4 75 0.2 55 
Jordan 6.6 0.9 4.3 1.3 0.4 0.9 100 0.8 7.3 
Kuwait 26.7 3.8 2 0.6 3.1 6.6 15 0.15 8 
Lebanon 7.7 1.1 3.5 1.1 0.4 0.6 49 0.09 3 
Libya 25 3.6 5.6 1.7 1.4 3 65 15.1 2.7 
Oman 12.2 1.8 2.2 0.6 1.8 3.8 44 2.6 2.7 
Palestine 3.2 0.5 2.1 0.6 0.9 0.2 17 0.05 0.8 
Qatar 7.4 1.1 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.7 12 0.1 5.7 
Saudi 125 18 20 6.2 13.2 28 105 19.2 16.6 
Sudan 9.1 1.3 32.6 '9.9 0.4 0.8 89 21.5 18.5 
Svria 30 4.3 16.1 4.9 2 4.3 421 1.6 22 
Turkey 167 24 63.5 19.3 6 12.8 640 7.7 75.8 
UAE 39 5.6 2.2 0.7 1.9 4 65 0.7 14 
Yemen 9 1.3 13.9 4.2 0.4 0.7 42 4.5 8 
Key: 
1 GDP 
2 % Middle East GDP 
3 Population (millions) 
4 % Middle East population 
5 Defence expenditure ( $ billions) 
6 % Middle East defence expenditure 
7 Regular military forces (thousands) 
8 % Middle East land area 
9 Official international debt 
Sources: 
Anderson, The Middle East. IISS, The military balance 1999-2000. 
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Map 1: 
Middle East states and capitals 
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Map2: 
Middle East: Boundary issues 
0 km 1000 
1 CYPRUS: TURKEY· GREECE 
2 GOLAN HEIGHTS: ISRAEL~ SYRIA 
3 WEST BANK: ISRAEL • PALESTINE 
4 EGYPT • SUDAN 
5 SAUDI ARABIA ·YEMEN {lai1d) 
IS IRAQ • KUWAIT 
7 SAUDI AAABlA • UAE 
8 SHATT AL ARAB: fAAQ - IRAN 
9 ISLANDS: IRAQ • KUWAIT 
10 ISLANDS: SAUDI ARABIA. • KUW'Aif 
11 ISlANDS: BAHfiAIN • QATAR 
12 ISLAI\lDS: IRAN • UAE 
13 SAUDI ARABIA: YEMEtl (mllritlm•) 
14 TURKEY • GREECE 
16 CASPIAN SEA 
108 FORSVARSSTUDIER 6/2002 
Map3: 
Middle East: Main elements of the petroleum 
industry infrastructure 
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Map4: 
Middle East: Major drainage basins 
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MapS: 
Middle East schematic diagram 
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